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Many terrorist groups share a common goal with mainstream organizations and institutions: the 
search for greater efficiency through the Internet.  This pursuit of on-line efficiency has spawned a First 
Amendment dilemma.  The Internet’s ability to link geographically dispersed individuals to changing data 
without the filtering provided by traditional media is a substantial asset for domestic and transnational 
networks, from violent white supremacist groups1 to Al Qaeda.2  However, much of the Web’s 
terrorism-related content, including the abstract advocacy of violence, has manifest value as an exercise 
of free speech.  Modern First Amendment jurisprudence protects extreme speech as a form of 
engagement in the polity, and responds to fears that unleashing the government on speakers will permit 
the targeting of groups outside the perceived mainstream.3  Nevertheless, some Internet communications 
                                                 
1 Cf. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM  107 (1998) (noting that Internet is “favoured 
means of communication of militia members and other white supremacists”). 
2 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 266 (2004), available at www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (reporting that Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 
September 11 hijackers, used instant messaging as well as other methods to stay in touch with Al 
Qaeda superiors in the period immediately before the attacks); cf. Ronald J. Deibert & Janice Gross 
Stein, Social and Electronic Networks in the War on Terror, in BOMBS AND BANDWIDTH: THE 
EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY 157, 171 (Robert 
Latham ed., 2003) (noting Al Qaeda’s use of the Internet, while noting uncertainty about whether on-
line communication is “fundamentally important” to network’s survival and continued operations); Amy 
Waldman, Arrested Qaeda Operative: Life of Degrees and Aliases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at 
A9 (reporting on background of alleged “facilitator of communications for Al Qaeda who posted 
messages by e-mail and on Web sites,” possibly including detailed reconnaissance reports on financial 
institutions in the United States recovered from suspect’s laptop); Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web: 
Were the Madrid Bombings Part of a New, Far-Reaching Jihad Being Plotted on the Internet?, 
NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, 40, 49-50 (noting appearance of Al Qaeda strategic documents on Web, 
as well as use of Internet as “tool of communication” by perpetrators of Madrid train bombing). 
3 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that state can criminalize as 
incitement only communications that the speaker intends to create imminent risk of illegal conduct, and 
that reasonably could create such a risk); cf. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First 
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intended for the mobilization and implementation of violence should forfeit protection.   The difficulty lies 
in drawing lines that reach Internet communication the state can legitimately prohibit without chilling 
protected speech.  Theorists of the Internet would be the logical candidates for resolving this dilemma.  
Unfortunately, most Internet theorists have touched on terrorism in ways that are perfunctory or 
incomplete.  Even more seriously, many theorists argue for a descriptive model of Internet 
Exceptionalism, premised on qualitative distinctions between the Internet and earlier media, that would 
result in either over- or under-regulation of Internet communications.  The Internet Exceptionalist model 
has produced two groups that draw sharply different normative conclusions: the celebratory and 
cautionary schools.  Celebratory4 and cautionary5 approaches both invoke two attributes of the Internet: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Amendment Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 152, 166 
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (if “citizens in a democracy [must] experience their 
authorship of the state in ways that are anterior to the making of particular decisions ... a state [should] 
be constitutionally prohibited from preventing its citizens from participating in the communicative 
processes relevant to the formation of democratic public opinion”).  Following the usage of First 
Amendment scholars, this article uses the term “modern First Amendment” to refer to the understanding 
reflected in Brandenburg. 
4 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (advocating “digital 
commons” based on ideals animating development and implementation of open source software, and 
warning against government and corporate attempts to control cyberspace through changes in Internet 
architecture); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH BETWEEN 
FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE SYSTEM  (2004) (arguing 
for freer approach to exchange of information and other material on the Internet); cf. A. Michael 
Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net, 116 HARV. L. Rev. 749, 782-97 (2003) (arguing that 
standards of Internet governance approximate Habermas’s “ideal speech community”); see also David 
G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 
(2000) (praising Internet as arena for innovation and exercise of freedom, while arguing that Lessig’s 
warnings about concentrated corporate control are overstated and simplistic); Philip J. Weiser, The 
Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 568-76 (2003) 
(discussing “digital commons” approach as well as criticisms of the concept). 
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simultaneity and resistance to mediation.  
Simultaneity leverages the Internet’s speed and flexibility to allow people and groups to 
communicate readily and rapidly with others around the globe.  Lack of mediation allows Internet users 
to articulate their perspectives and plans without the filters that shape messages in traditional media.  
Celebratory commentators laud simultaneity and resistance to mediation as virtues that boost creativity, 
enhance the flow of information, and promote interaction and dialog.6  Cautionary scholars argue that 
the Internet can polarize populations and replace democratic discourse with the mere aggregation of 
consumer preferences.7   
The invocation of simultaneity and absence of mediation has historically been a staple of the 
debate about new media, newcomers to America, and the application of the First Amendment in times 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM  (2001); cf. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999) (arguing that Internet’s threat to privacy 
can also frustrate participation in governance); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: 
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosures, 53 DUKE L.J. 967 (2003) (same). 
6 See LESSIG, supra note 4; Froomkin, supra note 4.   
7 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5 (noting that the distinction between celebratory and cautionary 
approaches should not obscure their overlapping concerns).  See, e.g., 
A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (discussing privacy 
issues on the Internet).   In addition, Internet Exceptionalists have examined qualitative parallels between 
the Internet and earlier media.  Celebratory theorists, for example, have considered these parallels to 
illustrate the short-sightedness of overbroad readings of intellectual property ownership rights.  See, 
e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 53-61 (2004) (discussing how disputes about piracy of 
intellectual property played out in earlier media such as radio and cable television).  As is often the case 
with categories advanced by scholars, the differences here may reflect variations in tone and emphasis 
more than substance.  For an approach that seeks to distill principles for a balanced analysis, see Orin 
S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003) (arguing that 
disputes about Internet law often result from conflation of “external” perspective dealing with 
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of crisis.  The World War I cases such as Schenck,8 Abrams,9 and Frohwerk10 applied variants of the 
“bad tendency” test, which allowed the government to punish speech that tended to entice illegal acts, to 
limit the spread of dissent over America’s involvement in World War I.11  Government repression 
stemmed from concern about the simultaneity with which dissent could proliferate, aided by then 
relatively new technologies such as telegraph cable, motion pictures, and direct mail.  Doubts about the 
loyalty of America’s immigrant and working class population, perceived as simultaneously physically 
present in America but linked to enemy nations abroad, also played a crucial role.   
Holmes’s clear and present danger elaboration on the bad tendency test, with its compelling 
metaphor of fire in a crowded theatre,12 illustrates the speed of dissent in a new technological age, and 
its immunity from tempering influences.  Subsequent use of the clear and present danger test in 
                                                                                                                                                             
cyberspace architecture and “internal” perspective dealing with understandings of Internet users). 
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); cf. Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present 
Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 3, at 97 (discussing implications 
of Schenck and progeny). 
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
10 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); cf. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 
(1919) (upholding conviction of labor leader Eugene Debs for speech asserting that American 
involvement in World War I served the interests of the wealthy, and praising individuals who resisted 
draft). 
11 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free Speech in 
Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 431-41 (discussing origins of the test and arguing that subsequent 
courts had misapprehended its meaning). 
12 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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McCarthy Era cases such as Dennis v. United States13 suggests an increasing concern over 
technological innovation and simultaneous loyalties.  Even in the modern free speech area shaped by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio [insert cite], supposedly “neutral” legislation like the statute criminalizing the 
burning of draft cards upheld by the Court in United States v. O’Brien14 seemed driven by distaste for 
the mass-media spectacle of draft-eligible young people burning their draft cards in opposition to the 
Vietnam War.15     
In the Internet context, the cautionary view depicts on-line communication as a volatile, 
combustible space resembling Holmes’ fire in a crowded theatre.  This view could trigger the return of 
the repressive bad tendency test through the interpretation of neutral statutory provisions, such as the 
prohibition of material support of terrorist organizations or conspiracies.16  It would also legitimize 
government use of such provisions to marginalize particular groups, such as Arabs, South Asians, or 
Muslims,17 much as the World War I prosecutions targeted immigrants from Eastern and Central 
                                                 
13 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
14 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
15 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 328-31 (1989) 
(arguing that Court engaged in inappropriately deferential review of statute); Michael C. Dorf, 
Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1202-05 (1996) (same). 
16 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) 
(2002); cf. Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers 
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 200-07 (2003) (discussing 
appropriate scope of material support provisions). 
17 See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 
IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2003); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 
(2002) (describing the marginalization of particular communities after September 11); Peter Margulies, 
Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After September 11, 2002 UTAH L. 
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Europe.  In addition, a cautionary view would also permit suppression of on-line materials dealing with 
terrorist tactics or scientific knowledge, such as the ingredients for poison gas, that serve First 
Amendment values precisely because of their troubling content.18  On the other hand, accepting the 
celebratory view, with its pervasive skepticism about government regulation, could facilitate use of the 
Internet to build capabilities for collective violence.19  It could also permit domestic networks to use the 
Internet to threaten private persons, as in the case of the “Nuremberg Files” where individual doctors 
performing abortions were labeled as war criminals.20   
                                                                                                                                                             
REV. 481, 495-99 (same); Peter Margulies, Making “Regime Change” Multilateral: The War on 
Terror and Transitions to Democracy, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 389, 404-08 (2004) 
(discussing how changes to United States immigration law could promote democratic change globally); 
cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and 
Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 394-98 (2004) (discussing threats to equality 
and integrity of legal system in war on terror); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo 
Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 44-53 (2004) (arguing that detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base, 
virtually all Muslim in faith, were entitled to due process protections; anticipating Supreme Court 
decision in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (finding federal jurisdiction over Guantanamo 
detainees)). 
18 Cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (issuing 
injunction against publication of formula for hydrogen bomb). 
19 Celebratory theorists address issues of law and terrorism in passing, or display ambivalence.  
See LESSIG, supra note 7 at 111-12 (discussing availability on Internet of more comprehensive and 
eclectic coverage of September 11 attacks); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 173-75 (denying that 
Al Qaeda is a “network” in an information technology sense, while acknowledging the need for effective 
measures against terrorism consistent with constitutional principles).  In the absence of sustained analysis 
of law and terrorism, the celebratory theorists’ default position seems to be a suspicion of government 
regulation influenced by their perspective on the digital property wars.  See infra notes 85-86 and 
accompanying text.  While this perspective is instructive, it cannot dispose of every question regarding 
terrorism on-line. 
20 See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), 290 F.3d 1058 
(9th Cir. 2002) (publishing on-line and hard-copy “Wanted Posters” of individual doctors who 
performed abortions constituted “true threat” not entitled to First Amendment protection). 
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Responding to the inadequacies of Internet Exceptionalism, this article offers a participant-
centered analysis of terrorism and the Internet under the First Amendment.  The participant-centered 
view draws on the work of two thinkers, Louis Brandeis and Hannah Arendt, who argued both that 
engagement in civic discourse is crucial to democracy21 and that new technology poses particular 
challenges for self-governance.22  To promote participation, the participation-centered approach 
examines how proposed measures for regulating terrorist material on the Internet affect the level of civic 
                                                 
21 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the greatest danger to democracy is an “inert people”); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 198 (1958) (the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of words 
and deeds”).  The focus on participation has been a hall-mark of the revival of interest in civic 
republican thought, which stresses the importance of deliberation in the public sphere.  See Frank 
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); cf. Peter Margulies, The Mother with  Poor Judgment and 
Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal 
Education, 88 NW. U.  L. Rev. 695 (1994) (incorporating civic republican perspective in narratives 
from poverty law); Peter Margulies, Review Essay: Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 
TEX. L. Rev. 1139 (1995) (civic republican perspective on history of civil rights lawyering). 
22 HANNAH ARENDT, The Concept of History, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 41, 89 
(Viking Compass 1968)(1961) (expressing wariness about totalitarian uses of new technology); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 473-77 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (expressing 
similar concerns, in dissenting from holding that warrantless telephone tap did not violate Fourth 
Amendment).  In their commitments to an active citizenry, both Brandeis and Arendt reflected a concern 
with modern threats to liberty and a fascination with the classical origins of democratic theory and 
practice.  See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 37 (discussing public-private distinction 
in Athenian “political consciousness”); John McGowan, Must Politics Be Violent? Arendt’s Utopian 
Vision, in HANNAH ARENDT & THE MEANING OF POLITICS 263, 278 (Craig Calhoun & John 
McGowan eds., 1997) (discussing Arendt’s vision of civic discourse as influenced by Greek polis); 
PHILIPPA STRUM , BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM  102-07 (1993) (discussing Brandeis’s deep 
interest in Athenian democracy); Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic 
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM . & MARY L. REV. 653, 680-82 
(1988) (discussing relationship of Brandeis’s interest in Athenian democracy with his vision of the First 
Amendment).     
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engagement of both speaker and audience.   
For the participant-centered view, civic engagement and the right to privacy are complementary. 
 Efforts to promote participation should include protection of privacy as a refuge from what Arendt 
describes as the harsh and sometimes threatening “glare”23 of the public realm.  Under this view law 
should address the Internet’s power to both connect and intrude. 
To this end, the participant-centered account acknowledges that the Internet’s reach holds 
unprecedented potential for global conversations and connections.  In times of crisis, governments often 
regard this potential as a threat, and target the participation of newcomers or subordinated groups in 
new media.24  In response, courts should interpret statutes, including purportedly “neutral” enactments 
that impose incidental burdens on speech, to preserve participation and guard against targeting of 
perceived outsiders.  Courts should also scrutinize attempts by government and corporations to limit 
participation by monopolizing knowledge deemed too risky for distribution on the Internet.  However, 
some Internet regulation is necessary to preserve participation from the chill of threats and to reach 
concerted illegality outside the realm of civic engagement.  Law should curb terrorist networks’ use of 
the Internet for communication about pending operations and acquisition of new resources for violence. 
 Law should also limit the use of the Internet to intrude on privacy for purposes of intimidation. 
                                                 
23 See ARENDT, The Crisis in Education, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE, supra note 22, at 
172, 186. 
24 See Rafal Rohozinski, Bullets to Bytes: Reflections on ICT’s and “Local” Conflicts, in 
BOMBS AND BANDWIDTH, supra note 2, at 215, 229 (asserting that Israeli Defense Force sought to 
dismantle Palestinians’ Internet capability as part of its response to the Palestinian Second Intifada; 
author concedes that Israel had been target of cyber-attacks, but argues that “few if any of the attacks 
emanated from the West Bank and Gaza”). 
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The article is in six Parts.  Part I discusses the history of new media, newcomers, and the First 
Amendment.  Part II discusses the development by courts and commentators of cautionary and 
celebratory perspectives on Internet Exceptionalism.  Part III analyzes the Internet’s implications for 
terrorist organizations and government policy after September 11, and discusses the perils of both over- 
and under-regulation of the Internet.  Part IV presents the participant-centered view as an alternative to 
Internet Exceptionalism’s over- or under-regulation.  Part V applies the model to specific examples, 
including the prohibition of Internet-based “material support” to terrorist organizations and conspiracies, 
the publication on the Web of terrorist manuals or dangerous scientific processes, and the use of the 
Internet to circulate “true threats” against groups such as abortion providers.  Part VI considers 
alternatives to the participant-centered model. 
 
 I. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES, NEW MEDIA, AND  
 NEWCOMERS TO AMERICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The history of restrictions on free speech, like the history of free speech itself, is a story of legal 
attempts to cope with the rush of the “new”.  The “new” includes new technology, and also new 
demographic developments promoted by immigration.25  Courts, legislators, and the executive branch, 
                                                 
25 See COLE, supra note 17, at 111-12 (discussing persecution of immigrant dissenters after 
America’s entry into World War I); BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 101 (2001) 
(praising participation of immigrants such as the activist Emma Goldman, whom the government 
deported after her conviction on charges related to her dissent from America’s intervention in World 
War I); cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 59 
(1983) (arguing against discrimination against aliens regarding political participation); Linda S. Bosniak, 
Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1130-
33 (1994) (arguing for greater First Amendment protections in immigration law). 
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as well as commentators, have focused on two overlapping phenomena linked with the new: simultaneity 
and absence of mediation.   
Simultaneity involves the cultural ability to identify, empathize, and coordinate with other persons 
sharing cultural, national, or ideological backgrounds despite geographic dispersion.  For the scholar 
Benedict Anderson, this conception of simultaneity emerged after the discovery of the “New World” of 
the Americas, fueled by “an accumulation of technological innovations” in shipbuilding, navigation, and 
printing.26  Emigration from Europe to the Americas accelerated this notion of simultaneity, as settlers in 
the New World cultivated parallels with their countries of origin.27  
Absence of mediation refers to the ability to bypass institutions that influence and temper 
thinking, feeling, and acting.   Philosophers and social commentators confronting modernization in the 
late 19th Century were concerned that traditional sources of mediation would break down as more 
people concentrated in urban centers to take advantage of employment generated by technological 
innovation.28  Mobility of people was disconcertingly matched by mobility in ideas, goods, and capital,29 
                                                 
26 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM  188 (rev. ed. 1991) (1983); cf. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of 
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 459-73 (2002) (discussing impact of Anderson’s view of 
simultaneity and the cognitive and intellectual construction of nations across physical borders in the 
context of the Internet’s impact on jurisdiction). 
27 See ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 187-88. 
28 See JAMES T. KLOPPENBURG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, 152 (1986) (“Technology was 
transforming social structure and cultural values, but the shape of the society and culture that would 
replace them remained shrouded in doubt”); CHARLES TAYLOR, The Direct-Access Society, in 
MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 155, 160 (2004) (noting that modernity offers “an access unmediated 
by any... other allegiances or belongings”). 
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which could move more quickly than the mediating structures that earlier had sufficed to contain them.  
Absence of mediation also reflects demographic movements.  As Northern Europeans established their 
dominion in the Americas, they became concerned that immigration of poor people and people from 
Southern and Eastern Europe would result in resistance to established cultural and national traditions.30  
Regulation of new media occurred at the juncture of technological and demographic change. 
 
A. New Media, Newcomers, and Regulation  
To see the impact of these conceptions of simultaneity and absence of mediation on the 
development of doctrine and attitudes toward the First Amendment, it is useful to consider the history of 
government regulation of media and technology in the decades leading up to World War I.  Many 
commentators of the period saw the need for greater government regulation to prevent abuses of an 
untrammeled market affected by new technology.31  This trend affected books and printed matter, such 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 28, at 152 (citing the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey as noting 
the challenges of “industry which is world wide in scope”). 
30 See COLE, supra note 17; HONIG, supra note 25.  Transmuted into fear of immigrants from 
Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South Asia, this dynamic continues today.  See 
Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism: Peter Brimelow and the Decline 
of the West, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!  THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI –IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 300, 300-13 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (analyzing concerns of immigration opponents 
such as Peter Brimelow, author of the book, “Alien Nation”); Volpp, supra note 17 (same); Muneer 
Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day after September 11, 20.3 Social Text 101 
(2002) (same); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law 
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM . L. 
295 (2002) (same). 
31 See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 61-64 (1984) (discussing establishment of 
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as newspapers, which became cheaper because of falling paper prices and new printing technology, and 
more methodical and “scientific” marketing.32  Devices such as the telegraph and the telephone 
enhanced simultaneity and resistance to mediation, and the railroads facilitation in the delivery of mail 
meant that media were “able to move... messages more quickly than in the past, breaking down barriers 
of distance and tying markets and other institutions more closely together.”33   
For progressives, decisions to leave ownership of the telegraph and the telephone, as opposed 
to the mails, in private hands, created concerns about overreaching and actions against the public 
interest.34  Supporting greater regulation of new technology through the common law, Brandeis and 
Warren wrote about the role of these technological developments in making individual and private 
information readily available with a pace and absence of context hitherto unprecedented, thereby 
threatening privacy, dignity, and attributes of personhood.35  In sum, for many in the Progressive Era, 
simultaneity and the erosion of mediating structures in the new media created not only opportunities, but 
also risks requiring regulation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Interstate Commerce Commission and rise of federal regulation of transportation); cf. William J. Novak, 
Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 97, 125 (2000) (“By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the same legal and 
governmental powers of the state that bolstered and supplemented economic decision making came to 
be deployed as antagonistic checks on the excesses of market allocations”). 
32 See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 148 (2004). 
33 See id. at 189. 
34 Id. at 188. 
35 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193, 195 (1890-91). 
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New media created heightened anxiety when coupled with concerns over immigration.36  In the 
early years of the 20th Century, the burgeoning popularity of motion pictures triggered concern because 
their makers and distributors, as well as their audience, included many immigrants.37  The Supreme 
Court’s insistence in Mutual Films Corp. v. Industrial Com. of Ohio that movies were not entitled to 
First Amendment protection exemplified this trend.38  The Court cited what it viewed as the potential 
corruption of entire families, both adults and children, through the movies as a basis for this susceptibility 
to regulation.39  For the Court, motion pictures were unmediated “spectacles... representations of 
events.”40  However, moviemakers intended them not as expressions of mediated opinion, but instead 
                                                 
36 In the late 1800's, the Supreme Court held that Congress had plenary power over 
immigration.  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); cf. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 15-17 (1992) (discussing roots of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 
animus of white Californians toward Chinese immigrants); Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin, 
Emerging from the Margins of Historical Consciousness: Chinese Immigrants and the History of 
American Law, 17 LAW. & HIST. Rev. 325 (1999) (same); see generally Margulies, Uncertain 
Arrivals, supra note 17 (discussing distortions in political process encouraged by aliens’ second-class 
status). 
37 See STARR, supra note 32, at 295 (“During their first two decades, the motion pictures in 
America had a primarily urban, working-class audience drawn heavily from new immigrant groups, and 
the movie industry itself... soon came under the control of immigrant entrepreneurs, most of them 
Jewish”); cf. MICHAEL ROGIN, BLACKFACE, WHITE NOISE: JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE HOLLYWOOD 
MELTING POT 16 (1996) (noting role of Jewish immigrants in developing “twentieth-century mass 
culture in the United States,” as well as interaction with African-Americans in culture and politics). 
38 See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
39 Id. at 242; cf. STARR, supra note 32, at 312 (analyzing case). 
40 Mut. Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 244; see also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS 174-75 (1997) (discussing early legal rulings on the motion picture industry). 
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as “a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit.”41 
The lack of mediation the courts perceived in movie production was echoed in the effect of 
movies on their audiences: motion pictures were “capable of evil... [and] insidious... corruption” because 
of their “attractiveness and manner of exhibition.”42  The unmediated character of the movies’ content 
and audience, with children receiving messages directly, without the tempering influence of parental 
translation, exacerbated the risk of simultaneity.  Movies could quickly and irreversibly inculcate 
audiences with undesirable sentiments and habits, much as diseases might spread through tightly packed 
immigrant communities.  
Concern over the pernicious combination of new media and immigration attained currency not 
because of proof of causation, but because of the power of metaphor.  When future Justice of the 
Supreme Court John Hessin Clarke noted in 1901 that he detested the “‘philosophy’ of the ‘reds’... 
[that] should find no room for culture or spread”43 in American society, the analogy to newly discovered 
bacteria was clear.44  The metaphor of combustibility was also pervasive.   Delivering explosives in the 
                                                 
41 Mut. Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 244. 
42 Id. at 242-244. 
43 See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND FREE SPEECH 206 (1987). 
44 Cf. Paul Rozin & Carol Nemeroff, Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and 
Similarity “Heuristics”, in HEUERISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 
201 (Thomas Gilovich, et al. eds. 2002) (discussing development and possible origins of attributions of 
contagion in popular culture); see generally MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 126-27, 139 (1966) (noting that in pre-modern societies 




mail and in the public square was a tactic of violent political groups of the time.45  Progressives had long 
perceived cities, with their substantial immigrant communities, as incubators of corruption.46  Just as an 
explosion occurs because an explosive agent comes in contact with susceptible material, extreme 
speech under this metaphor reacts when it comes into contact with congested immigrant urban 
communities lacking personal, social, or institutional inhibitions.  Explosive violence results.  Perhaps the 
Progressives’ interest in science and technology made them more willing to employ images drawn from 
science, such as injection of poison and the chain reaction, to justify greater government authority over 
the media and speech.47 
 
  B. New Media, Newcomers, and Crisis: The World War I Cases and Their Progeny 
                                                 
45 For example, groups made efforts to send bombs to politicians, prominent businessmen, and 
even judges.  See POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 55-61 (discussing activities of New York City bomb 
squad). 
46 See Larry Walker, Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Reform, and Public Administration, 
104 POL. SCI. Q. 509, 515 (1989). 
47 See RABBAN, supra note 40, at 227-28 (noting the philosopher John Dewey’s commitment 
to the scientific method, and arguing that while Dewey recognized value of free speech for making sound 
policy, he did not display a comparable commitment to protecting speech that might be hateful, extreme, 
or in some fashion socially counter-productive); cf. Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The 
Making of America’s “First Freedom,” 1909-31, 40 WM . & MARY L. REV. 557, 629 (1999) 
(quoting Progressive intellectual Walter Lippmann as arguing that “gathering and dissemination of 
information... should be controlled by government communications bureaus”); Robert M. Cover, The 
Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 349 (1981) (discussing 
cross-currents in First Amendment debates); see also Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering and 
the Pragmatist Dilemma, in RENASCENT PRAGMATISM : STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 220, 
223-25 (Alfonso Morales ed., 2003) (analyzing how instabilities in Dewey’s pragmatist thought led to 




Progressive anxiety about the interaction of new media and immigration came to a head during 
the American involvement in World War I.48  The Wilson Administration feared the role of modern 
technology such as submarine cable in spreading information abroad about American dissent,49 and so 
encouraging wartime opponents.50 For Wilson, the technologies of cable, inexpensive printing, and 
efficient mail delivery provided the means for “hyphenated groups” linked in real time with their ethnic 
brothers and sisters in enemy nations.51  Opponents of the war, who believed that American 
involvement aided imperialist regimes and risked American lives, sometimes used technology that was 
                                                 
48 Of course, proponents of regulation during the Progressive Era included a spectrum of 
thinkers with varying priorities and perspectives.  Cf. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 28, at 362-63 
(discussing range of Progressive thinkers and activists, including opponents of business concentration, 
led by Woodrow Wilson; advocates of scientific administration linked to Teddy Roosevelt, and 
champions of social welfare, led by Croly, Lippmann, and Dewey).  Each of these groups, however, to 
some degree bought into the naive hope that modern technologies of war could be harnessed to create a 
better world through American intervention in World War I, and accepted the importance of curtailing 
dissent associated with that effort.  Id.  Cf. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917-1921, at 30 (1960) (quoting Roosevelt as criticizing wartime censorship); id. at 
10 (noting “nativist” tone of Roosevelt’s “bellicose campaign on behalf of [Republican Presidential 
candidate] Hughes” in 1916 election). 
49 See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 75 (1979) (describing executive order of 1917 regarding cable and land telegraph lines that 
expanded censorship and gave the War Department power to censor overseas messages, including 
reports of domestic American news sent to foreign newspapers); STARR, supra note 32, at 223-25 
(Progressive impulse toward regulation). 
50 See MURPHY, supra note 49, at 54 (quoting Wilson as criticizing those who would “divide 
our people into antagonistic groups and thus... destroy that complete agreement and solidarity of the 
people and that unity of sentiment and purpose so essential to the perpetuity of the Nation and its free 
institutions” and urging that “all men of whatever origin or creed who would count themselves Americans 
[should] join in making clear to all the world, the unity and subsequent power of America.  This is an 
issue of patriotism”). 
51 See SCHEIBER, supra note 48, at 7 (Wilson “denounced the foreign-born as responsible for 
‘the gravest threats against our national peace and safety’”). 
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sophisticated for its day.  One group used such a technology – targeted direct mail – to send leaflets 
opposing American involvement in World War I to 15,000 inductees.52  In response, Wilson invoked 
images of contagion and toxicity, warning against those who would “inject the poison of disloyalty into 
our own most critical affairs.”53  To deal with the threat, the Wilson Administration developed a 
comprehensive program of monitoring, surveillance, and censorship.54   
The Wilson Administration also wished to limit the impact of “propaganda” spread by Germany 
and alleged German sympathizers in the United States.55  To counter this propaganda effort, George 
Creel, who ran Wilson’s wartime information department, the Committee on Public Information, started 
his own propaganda machine.  Creel took an active interest in the very new medium of motion pictures, 
and even provided scripts sending appropriate wartime messages to the motion picture industry.56  
At the same time, the bad tendency test that dominated judicial treatment of First Amendment 
issues reflected the scientific rhetoric of simultaneity and unmediated risks.  Here, too, perceptions of the 
risks of technology and immigration influenced outcomes.  The court’s basic premise stemmed from the 
                                                 
52 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM , AND DEMOCRACY 359 (2003), discussing 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
53 See MURPHY, supra note 49, at 54. 
54 See Stone, Free Speech in Wartime, supra note 11, at 412-13. 
55 See SCHEIBER, supra note 48, at 11-12 (quoting Wilson’s Attorney General as urging 
legislation, ultimately passed as the Espionage Act of 1917, to address “the new conditions of warfare 
by propaganda”). 
56 See MURPHY, supra note 49, at 108; see also GEORGE CREEL, HOW WE ADVERTISED 
AMERICA: THE FIRST TELLING OF THE AMAZING STORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC 




law of seditious and criminal libel, which allowed government to punish speech that possessed a 
tendency to encourage illegal acts.  As interpreted by the courts, the bad tendency test relied on theories 
of group psychology that viewed crowds as easily susceptible to suggestion.57  The Court was willing to 
defer to legislative views that the proliferation of media advocating offensive positions created a 
tendency to disobey the law.58  In fact, concern over the tendency of immigrants to exploit the volatile 
moods of concentrated urban populations helped push the Court to uphold the conviction and 
deportation of John Turner, an English anarchist, under the Alien Immigration Act of 1903, which 
excluded from admission to the United States “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the 
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all government or of all 
forms of law.”59 For the Court, Turner’s deportation had no implications for free speech, but rested 
instead on Congress’s ability to limit “undesirable additions to our population.”60 
The dissent of political radicals, many of them immigrants, to American involvement in World 
War I heightened judicial reliance on images of simultaneity and unmediated risk.   In Frohwerk v. 
United States,61 Justice Holmes wrote for the Court upholding a conviction under the Espionage Act 
based on distribution of a circular protesting the war, deferring to the government’s view that 
                                                 
57 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN 
ANXIOUS AGE 12-14, 75-76 (2004) (discussing theories of crowd behavior first popularized by social 
commentator Gustave Le Bon). 
58 See RABBAN, supra note 40, at 134. 
59 Id. at 135; United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 293 (1904). 
60 RABBAN, supra note 40, at 136, citing 194 U.S. at 293-95. 
61 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
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“circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame.”62  
Most famously, in Schenck v. United States, Holmes upheld a conviction under the Espionage Act for 
the targeted direct mail campaign described above, even though the defendants never urged the 
inductees to refuse to report.  Concerned that the bad tendency test was unduly restrictive of free 
speech,63 Holmes nevertheless argued that in war-time the stakes might be so high that dissent, 
permissible at other times, would pose a “clear and present danger” of interference with the war effort.64 
 While the “clear and present danger” test stressed the simultaneity of the speech and the evil it would 
produce, it also captured the unmediated nature of the risk that communities of immigrants and others 
open to suggestion would respond to dissent not with deliberation, reflection, or debate, but instead with 
lawlessness.65  Illustrating his point, Holmes again invoked the combustibility metaphor, arguing that the 
First Amendment would not protect a person in “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”66 
However, as Holmes argued a few months later, the tropes of simultaneity and absence of 
mediation also pose risks because of their ability to justify government overreaching.  In Abrams v. 
United States, a case dealing with Jewish immigrants who circulated pamphlets, one written in 
                                                 
62 Id. at 209. 
63 Cf. Stone, Free Speech in Wartime, supra note 11, at 431-41 (discussing “bad tendency” 
test). 
64 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
65 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 203-04 (Mark deWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (offering Holmes’s 
rationale for the Schenck and Debs decisions upholding the conviction and imprisonment of wartime 
dissenters, while expressing some doubts about the continuation of the government’s repressive course, 
particularly after the war’s conclusion). 
66 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
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Yiddish,67 criticizing America’s efforts to send troops to Russia after the Russian Revolution, the 
majority followed the bad tendency test,68 but Holmes dissented.69  Holmes’ view here, influenced by 
Prof. Chafee of Harvard, Judge Learned Hand, and Justice Brandeis,70 was that ideas, including 
“opinions that we loathe,” would compete for public acceptance.  Action would not necessarily follow 
thought mechanically, but would result from a more mediated, deliberative process.  For more extreme 
ideas, dissipation and dilution would be the most likely outcome of prolonged exposure.71  
Unfortunately, new crises after World War II again precipitated resort to Holmes’s “clear and 
present danger” test as a vehicle for addressing the simultaneity and unmediated risks posed by new 
technology and immigration.  In Dennis v. United States,72 a case upholding the Smith Act, which 
prohibited membership in the Communist Party, the Court again resorted to the combustibility image, 
                                                 
67 See POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 49-55. 
68 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
69 Id. at 627-28. 
70 See Gerald GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 151-70 (1994) 
(discussing Hand’s interaction with Holmes and his opinion in the Masses case, which foreshadowed the 
Supreme Court’s turn toward a more speech-protective view of incitement under the First Amendment 
in Brandenburg some fifty years later); POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 236, 241 (discussing reactions 
of Brandeis, Chafee, Hand, and Holmes’s long-time correspondent Harold Laski to Holmes’s opinion); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 341-45 (2003) (discussing background of Masses case). 
71 As Holmes put it, “[i]n the main I am for aeration of all effervescing convictions – there is no 
way so quick for letting them get flat.”  See HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 65, at 204. 
72 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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justifying its decision by alluding to the “inflammable nature of world conditions”73 and noting that, “[i]f 
the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the government to wait until the catalyst is 
added.”74  The Court’s language invoked not just a standard explosion, but the nuclear variety that had 
become all too familiar since the conclusion of the war.75    
Picking up the absence of mediation theme, Justice Frankfurter in his Dennis concurrence also 
noted, in an echo of the Court’s earlier Mutual Film case, that government could regulate new 
technology such as radio far more readily than traditional hard-copy sources, quoting a First 
Amendment scholar’s argument that the radio “is not engaged in the task of enlarging and enriching 
human communication.... [but] in making money.”76  Focusing also on the descendants of immigrants 
who purportedly formed the backbone of the Communist Party in the United States, Frankfurter noted 
the threat of simultaneity by citing the Chinese Exclusion cases that held that such immigration could 
constitute a particularly insidious form of “foreign aggression and encroachment.”77  The opinion of the 
Court echoed this theme, noting the danger posed by “countries with whom petitioners were... 
                                                 
73 Id. at 511. 
74 Id. 
75 Justice Frankfurter echoed this view in his concurrence with his allusion to notorious atom spy 
Klaus Fuchs.  Id. at 548 n.13.  For background on the atomic espionage cases and their relationship to 
anti-Communist repression after World War II, see Michael E. Parrish, Revisited: The Rosenberg 
“Atom Spy” Case, 68 UMKC L. REV. 601 (2000). 
76 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524 n.5 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 104 (1948)). 





C. The Modern First Amendment and the End of History (Not) 
In 1969, the Court finally drained the vestiges of the bad tendency test from the standard for 
incitement, joining a demanding version of Holmes’s clear and present danger test with a subjective 
element involving the speaker’s intent.  Under this “modern” understanding of the First Amendment, 
statements preceding acts of violence can constitute incitement only if the speaker intended violence to 
result and violence was an imminent and likely consequence of her statements.79  Yet, Brandenburg 
reflects the Court’s understanding that in times of crisis government will seek to exaggerate simultaneity 
and minimize the existence of mediation.80  
However, the consensus surrounding the modern First Amendment does not herald the end of 
history for the jurisprudence of free speech.  Doctrine has carved out a number of areas where the 
government can regulate communication, making Brandenburg less central.81  Moreover, in the shadow 
                                                 
78 Id. at 511. 
79 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
80 See Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: 
Why Proliferating New Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to 
Abandon its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech, and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, 
and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 907 (1996) (arguing that the 
strong speech-protective test in Brandenburg emerged because “experience with weaker formulations . 
. . had shown how easily the government could impoverish political dialogue by suppressing speech that 
it deemed subversive of the established order”). 
81 The government can impose “incidental burdens” on speech that are content-neutral and 
narrowly tailored to serve important public objectives such as preservation of intellectual property rights, 
see Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449-53 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding constitutionality 
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of September 11, law arising from new media such as the Internet retains the potential to disrupt the 
modern equilibrium.   
 
II. SYNERGIES AND DISCONNECTS: CONCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNET 
As a new medium, the Internet inherits the concerns about simultaneity and unmediated risk 
raised by earlier generations of media innovations.82  At the same time, the growth in concern over 
terrorist networks since September 11 magnifies apprehensions about exploitation of the Internet’s 
capabilities for violent purposes.  This convergence of concern requires a nuanced treatment of the 
interaction between the Internet’s capabilities and the nature of transnational terrorist networks.  An 
unrestrained celebratory view of the Internet may discount synergies with terrorism, leading to under-
                                                                                                                                                             
of Digital Millennium Copyright Act), or disruption of the funding of transnational violent networks.  See 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b) (2002) (barring 
“material support” to groups designated by the Secretary of State as terrorist organizations); see also 
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. For Relief and Development, 291 F.3d 1000 
(7th Cir. 2002) (upholding constitutionality of prohibition on material support); Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. den. sub nom Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001) (upholding statute, while holding that certain terms were vague as 
applied).  The government can also regulate commercial speech.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980).  In addition, threats of violence do not 
receive First Amendment protection.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross-burning with 
intent to intimidate constitutes true threat unprotected by First Amendment).  Criminal conspiracies are 
similarly unprotected.  See United States v. Abdel Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the federal seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. §2384, does not violate First Amendment, the 
court noted that while “laws targeting ‘sedition’ must be scrutinized with care to assure that the threat of 
prosecution will not deter expression of unpopular viewpoints by persons ideologically opposed to the 
government... [t]he Government, possessed of evidence of conspiratorial planning, need not wait until 
buildings and tunnels have been bombed and people killed before arresting the conspirators”). 
82 See Freedman, supra note 80, at 960 (“governments are haunted by the fear that the 
mechanisms of communications may be outrunning those of control”). 
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regulation of the Internet.  However, an overly cautionary approach may neglect the substantial benefits 
of the Internet for democracy, and lead to over-regulation, including the targeting of immigrants 
characteristic of the World War I cases.83   This section analyzes theoretical and judicial conceptions of 
the Internet.  In the process, it prepares the ground for a nuanced examination of the relationship 
between Internet capabilities and terrorist violence. 
 
A. Internet Exceptionalism 
Many prominent commentators embrace a view we can call “Internet Exceptionalism,” which 
stresses distinctions between the Internet and earlier communications media such as books, 
newspapers, and broadcasts.  Internet Exceptionalists cite a variety of the Internet’s attributes, centering 
on the same simultaneity and absence of mediation that preoccupied courts and commentators with 
regard to previous technological innovations.  For example, Internet Exceptionalists note how the 
Internet enhances consumers’ ability to assemble an individualized collage of information from a variety 
of specialized and partisan sources, without the intercession of an intermediary, such as an editor, who 
may offer a broader perspective.84 
                                                 
83 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
84 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 43 (in describing the dynamic that encourages file-
sharing and individual re-mixes of music, commentator notes that, “We share music in a circle... [w]e 
want to... mess with it, remake it.  We want to make it ours and use what flows around us to build new 
music”).  Some commentators argue that for particular legal purposes, such as resolving issues of 
jurisdiction, the Internet does not require special treatment.  See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against 
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (rejecting view that jurisdiction over Internet requires 




This descriptive view of the Internet does not lead to a uniform normative outlook.  Within the 
Internet Excepionalist school we can identify two principal points of view.  The first we can call the 
celebratory approach.  Commentators taking this view celebrate the attributes of the Internet and argue 
that the technological and user interface attributes of the medium create a new imperative of user 
freedom.  For these commentators, government regulation stands in the way of the full celebration of the 
Internet’s advantages for the dissemination of information and the cultivation of innovation.85  Lawrence 
Lessig, for example, argues that the application of copyright and other conceptions of intellectual 
property to the Internet can foster unhealthy government and corporate control.86  Indeed, for 
celebratory commentators, government regulation is not only normatively inappropriate, it is futile, given 
the relatively free-flowing nature of current Internet architecture.   
In contrast, another, perhaps less populous school of Internet Exceptionalists takes a cautionary 
view that accepts many of the premises of the celebratory school but draws far more dire normative 
                                                 
85 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 43 (noting that “[t]he rise of peer-to-peer 
technology... threatened the powerful companies that invest billions in production, distribution, and 
marketing”). 
86 See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 157 (critiquing provisions of Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).  For celebratory theorists, the cardinal story of the Internet is the conflict 
between the potential for freedom and creativity represented by the free-flowing nature of present 
Internet architecture, and the curtailment of fair use rights through licensing restrictions imposed by 
software manufacturers.  Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2004) (praising 
Internet’s potential independence from mass media controlled by large corporations); James Boyle, 
Governance of the Internet: A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5, 10 
(2000) (expressing concern about concentration of control of the Internet). 
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conclusions.87  This school would argue that a greater government role is necessary to curb the potential 
of the Internet for polarization and intellectual and civic fragmentation.  One theorist has acknowledged 
that, “[p]eer-to-peer networks... don’t do much to build new communities... few systems allow fans to 
deliberate about music or make connections and decisions collaboratively... [o]ften you find what you 
already know about.”88  On this cautionary view, mediation, although occasionally oppressive and 
inconvenient, can also allow consumers of information the opportunity to try something they might 
otherwise have rejected as inconsistent with their preconceptions.  In the process, people’s minds can 
change, their perspectives can evolve, and group-think and polarization become a little more difficult.  
This is the goal of core mediating institutions in a liberal society, such as universities.89  Serendipity – the 
benefits of a surprise encounter with the unexpected or underestimated – is one of the virtues of this 
idea.  Unfortunately, since many Internet searches reflect the predispositions of the user, cyberspace in 
practice offers “little opportunity for serendipity.”90  
The celebratory and cautionary Internet Exceptionalists focus on different bugbears: government 
and corporate control for the celebratory scholars, and polarization for the cautionary school.  The 
                                                 
87 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51-65 (discussing polarization on the Internet prompted by 
lack of traditional filters); PAUL VIRILIO, THE INFORMATION BOMB 8-12 (2000) (warning about threats 
to local traditions and governance embodied in growth of cyberspace). 
88 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 60-61. 
89 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding university admissions policies that 
take race into account to promote diversity in education); but see Dan Hunter, Phillip.com 
Republic.com, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 638-40 (2002) (rejecting cautionary critique by arguing that 
individuals’ choices regarding traditional media can also promote polarization, and that Internet provides 
filtering mechanisms). 
90 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 61. 
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literature is rich, but an integrated approach addressing each of these perils has been elusive.  As the 
next subsection demonstrates, courts confronting individual cases have similarly produced sharply 
varying results. 
 
B. Courts and the Internet 
Courts have been mixed in their treatment of the themes of simultaneity and absence of 
mediation on the Internet.  Some decisions have taken a cautionary view, stressing the need to cabin the 
power of Internet to protect property rights or safeguard the public.91  Other decisions have veered 
toward the celebratory view, asserting that the speed and flexibility of the Internet make regulation 
futile92 and sometimes unfair.  Decisions regarding intellectual property, on-line pornography, and 
criminal law all reveal this split. 
For a classic example of the cautionary view, consider Universal City Studios v. Corley,93 in 
which the court upheld as an incidental burden on speech a statutory prohibition on distributing software 
for the primary purpose of circumventing restrictions on viewing digital versatile disks (DVD’s).  The 
court asserted that codes distributed in this manner “instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks 
                                                 
91 See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that websites 
containing computer code for evading manufacturers’ use restrictions on digital products violate federal 
statute); cf. United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that on-line bomb 
threat sent by defendant in Utah to girlfriend within state, but transmitted to and from Internet Service 
Provider’s architecture in Virginia, constituted “interstate” threat under federal law). 
92 But see LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 124-30 (warning that changes in Internet 
architecture promoted by government and large corporations as response to simultaneity may create 
more restrictive and effective regulatory regime). 
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and instantly render the results...available throughout the world via the Internet.”94  Another court, in 
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner disagreed, arguing that the instantaneous nature of Internet 
transmission meant that the value of the plaintiffs’ asserted property right had already been 
compromised many times over prior to the court’s decision.95  Therefore, according to the court, there 
was no irreparable harm, making an injunction unnecessary and punitive.  
In the on-line pornography area, the Supreme Court has adopted a celebratory view when 
dealing with content-based regulation.  For example, consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Ashcroft v. ACLU.96  In this case, the Court held that a restriction on Internet pornography harmful to 
minors would not survive First Amendment scrutiny.  The majority observed that the sheer number of 
hosts worldwide made content-based regulation at the source difficult, if not impossible.97  The Court 
also declined to view children’s exposure to pornography on-line as unmediated, citing the potential for 
evolving technology such as parentally-installed filters to provide checks at the recipient end without 
chilling speech at the source.98 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
94 Id. at 451.  For a critique of the District Court’s opinion in Corley, which the appellate court 
sustained, see Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 
(2002) (arguing that the District Court failed to consider the nature and frequency of change on the 
Internet). 
95 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 251 (2004). 
96 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004). 
97 Id. at 2792. 
98 Id. at 2792-93; cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (striking down earlier effort 
to limit on-line pornography, and asserting that because Internet content depends in large part on 
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However, the cautionary view is dominant when the Court can classify the measure at issue as 
outside the realm of content-regulation.  In United States v. American Library Association,99 for 
example, the Court upheld a measure requiring libraries to install filters to block pornography on the 
Internet as a condition of receiving federal financial assistance.  Here, the Court was so concerned 
about the prospect of unmediated access to the Internet that it downplayed the overbroad character of 
the filters required, which adversely affected access to a range of non-pornographic content.100  The 
Court also dismissed plausible alternatives to the filter requirement.101 
In the criminal law area, courts sometimes recognize that the accelerated and unmediated world 
of the Internet also creates a far greater risk of inadvertent or ephemeral actions leading to criminal 
liability.  A hard copy or even speech in real-time requires far greater deliberation, increasing the 
likelihood that acts considered orders, solicitations to perform criminal acts, incitements, or true threats 
will be premeditated.  In contrast, the Internet’s absence of mediation can become a trap for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
viewers’ informed and conscious choices, it was more susceptible to mediation within the home than 
broadcast media). 
99 United States v. American Library, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
100 Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
101 For example, the Court did not regard the possibility of installing filters only on computers 
used by minors as a basis for deeming the statute insufficiently tailored.  Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  Simultaneity has also played a role outside the realm of on-line pornography.  In a recent 
decision holding that the National Archives was not required to release graphic photos of Vince 
Foster’s body taken after his suicide, the Court cited the concern of Foster’s sister that the photos, 
once released, “would be placed on the Internet for world consumption.”  See Nat’l Archives & 
Records Adm. v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570, 1577 (2004).   
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unwary.  For example, in United States v. Alkhabaz,102 a student posted a graphic rape and abduction 
fantasy about a person bearing the name of a female dorm-mate to a message board, and was 
subsequently charged with making a threat of violence using instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 
Holding that the intent to make the female student aware was a crucial element of the charge, the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the charges.  As the Sixth Circuit noted, there was no evidence that the defendant 
wished to make the female student aware of his fantasy.103  Before the Internet, the defendant may have 
circulated his story in hard-copy form to persons sharing his admittedly troubling interests.  He would 
have understood that sending a copy to the female student could have yielded tort or even criminal 
liability, and would have conformed his conduct accordingly.104  In this way, the absence of mediation 
on the Internet – the breaking down of barriers between intended and unintended audiences – can lead 
to overreaching in the regulation of Internet speech and unfairness to defendants, unless courts pay 
careful attention to context. 
Here, too, however, courts sometimes embrace a pro-regulation view as a means of controlling 
the Internet’s new fora.  For example, a court has held that a government agent need not have probable 
cause to view conversations in a chat room and subsequently pose as an individual interested in child 
                                                 
102 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Scott Hammack, Note, 
The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a Modification of the Courts’ 
Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 92-93 (2002) 
(discussing Alkhabaz). 
103 The female student’s awareness of the defendant’s fantasy stemmed from third parties who 
brought the fantasy to her attention after a search of the Web yielded items including message board 
postings.  Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494-95. 
104 In Alkhabaz, there was no evidence that the defendant took any action to actualize his 
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pornography to secure evidence against another chat room visitor.105  A court could instead view a chat 
room as a forum whose openness some participants may not fully comprehend, leading to confused 
expectations.  By declining to suppress the agent’s chat room surveillance, the Court may have 
encouraged intrusive law enforcement tactics.  
In sum, courts move from a celebratory to a cautionary view with little consistency or overall 
analytical framework.  As the Internet matures, judicial consistency may similarly develop.  However, 
the risk is that the evolution of case law will suffer permanently from this patchwork beginning.106 
 
 III. THE INTERNET AND THE  
 STRUCTURE OF TERRORIST NETWORKS 
Analysis of the interaction of terrorism and the Internet also reflects the perils of dichotomies.  
The Internet offers significant synergies to entrepreneurs of violence.  However, it also holds out the 
                                                                                                                                                             
fantasy.  Id. 
105 Cf. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that 
defendant should have known that chat room permitted him to be “overheard” by other visitors).  Other 
negative externalities, such as loss of trust, result if the default position changes and Internet users 
assume that their audience is comprised of law enforcement personnel.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2001) (“[A]n internet user will not be 
sure that he is talking to a friend and not a government interloper seeking evidence of criminal activity.”). 
106 For an approach that seeks a nuanced but principled path through Internet law, albeit one 
that may be more deferential to law enforcement interests than the participant-centered approach 
outlined in this article, see generally Kerr, Perspective in Internet Law, supra note 7 (arguing that 
courts and legislatures should select either “external” perspective on Internet, shaped by the physical 
architecture of digital communication, or “internal” perspective, focused on the expectations of the 
parties, in fashion that maintains continuum with pre-digital approaches to regulation of law enforcement 
authorities and other actors). 
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hope of enhanced access for subordinated groups.  Neglecting either dimension of the Internet’s 
capability is dangerous.  To establish the synergies between the Internet and terrorist activity, this Part 
turns first to the absence of mediation in cyberspace, and secondly to the impact of simultaneity.  It then 
examines the countervailing potential of the Internet for building democracy through dialog.  Finally, this 
Part sketches some challenges at the post-September 11 intersection of the Internet and terrorism.   
 
A. Unmediated Character 
The absence of mediation on the Internet can promote polarization and permit consumers to 
avoid the unexpected teachable moment.107  On a technical level, the absence of entry barriers to 
Internet communication also facilitates the operations of terrorist groups.  I discuss each in turn.     
Lack of mediation is a key ingredient in the production of polarization and concerted violence 
against innocents to achieve political, cultural, or social aims.108  This concerted violence, typically, if 
perhaps too glibly called “terrorism,”109 can result from the actions of states110 or private groups of 
                                                 
107 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51-65 (discussing lack of mediating mechanisms on the 
Internet). 
108 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 429 (2002) (discussing role of polarization and group homogeneity in fomenting 
violence). 
109 See PHILIPB. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA 6 (1998) (defining terrorism as 
“violence conducted as part of a political strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a foreign 
state”).    
110 See, e.g., DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, TERROR 14-21 (1999) (discussing 
“totalitarian terror”);  Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First 
Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 323 (2000) (discussing “state 
terrorism” as one strand in debates about definition of terrorism). 
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domestic111 or transnational112 origin.  From the genocide of Rwanda and the Sudan to the efforts of 
white supremacists and anti-abortion extremists in the United States, governments or other organizations 
practicing concerted violence against innocents often emerge from shared sentiments of inequity or 
displacement.113  Exploiting these sentiments, entrepreneurs promote the appeal of exclusionary images 
of “authenticity.”114  Substantively, these exclusionary images thrive through comparisons with 
                                                 
111 In the course of American history, domestic groups such as the Ku Klux Klan have likely 
committed more acts of terrorist violence with varying degrees of involvement from state actors than 
transnational groups such as Al Qaeda.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (describing Klan as “terrorist organization”). 
112 See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 100-01 (reporting that during a speech in Los Angeles,  
Rabbi Meir Kahane, the New York native who founded the Israeli extremist group, Kach, “described 
the Arabs as ‘dogs’, as people who ‘multiply like fleas’ who must be expelled from Israel or 
eliminated”). 
113 See Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 393-95 (discussing how social 
comparisons generated by inequality augment social capital of terrorist groups); cf. AMY CHUA, 
WORLD ON FIRE 229 (2003) (discussing roots of anti-American global sentiment in economic 
inequality). 
114 Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 395-96 (discussing authenticity 
entrepreneurship in states and organizations); cf. CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE 
VIOLENCE 34 (2003) (discussing role of “political entrepreneurs” who “promote violence... by activating 
boundaries, stories, and relations that have already accumulated histories of violence; by connecting 
already violent actors with previously nonviolent allies; by coordinating destructive campaigns; and by 
representing their constituencies through threats of violence”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES 
NEED DISSENT 117 (2003) (“Al Qaeda has made a pervasive effort to... [emphasize] a shared identity, 
one that includes an “us” and excludes a “them”); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) (analyzing role of “availability 
entrepreneurs” in shaping public policy by exploiting salient narratives); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, 
THE LESSER EVIL 127 (2004) (arguing that state and organizational entrepreneurs of collective violence, 
whatever their stated ideology, practice “the redescription of intended victims as inferior creatures to be 
brushed aside on the path to a higher goal”); Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Terror, Islam, 
and Democracy,  J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 5, 7-8 (2002) (discussing the influence of Fascism and 
Communism on theorists of violent Islamism, including Sayyid Qutb). 
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“inauthentic” others, defined through traits such as race, ethnicity, nationality, or even occupation.115  
Procedurally, this stark view of authenticity entails the rejection of introspection, dialog, and debate as 
means for peacefully coming to terms with difference.116  By stigmatizing others and discrediting dialog, 
authenticity entrepreneurs designate violence as the tactic of choice. 
The unmediated nature of the Internet exacerbates polarization.  Most media, including 
broadcast and paper sources, have some form of mediation mechanism between their content and their 
audience.  In a newspaper, for example, the editor reviews the content, often seeking a range of stories 
and a range of views.117  This may not be the case for a web-site with minimal physical infrastructure, 
investment, or stake in the community.  Websites face even fewer constraints than most traditional 
media to the propagation of ideologically homogenous content, and often lack the legal staff or 
institutional culture to curb rumor, innuendo, and libel.  Web sites catering to particular niches tend to 
attract an audience of persons who already agree with the extreme opinions featured on the site.  
Homogeneous groups are likely to perceive both identity and grievances in a far more polarized fashion, 
                                                 
115 See Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 397. 
116 President Bush’s comments that other nations are either “for us or against us” in antiterrorism 
efforts echo the stark nature of pronouncements that lead to collective violence.   Cf. id. (criticizing 
“preemptive” approach of Bush Administration).   While force is sometimes necessary to deal with 
threats, such public pronouncements create a dynamic that makes the use of force more likely, even in 
the absence of necessity.  Terrorist organizations take similar rhetorical turns.  See Abu Khubayb & 
Abu Zubayr, Greater and ‘Lesser’ Jihad?, available on 
http://www.hamasonline.com/indexx.php?page=Qassam/greater_lesser_jihads (denying legitimacy 
under Islamic doctrine of view that jihad struggle to improve self is more important than violence 
directed at others); cf. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 429 (2002) (discussing role of polarization and 
group homogeneity in fomenting violence). 
117 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 71. 
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thereby promoting recruitment for violent acts, and impeding the interchange and deliberation crucial to 
democracy.118  
The Internet’s lack of mediation also facilitates rapid revision of web-site content in a fashion 
that can assist terrorist organizations.  A site that contains specific or personal information about 
potential targets of terrorist attacks, including buildings, installations, or people, can readily update that 
site as new information becomes available.  While people or groups can alter patterns of behavior to 
deal with other kinds of public threats, the flexibility and modifiability of Internet communications mean 
that those behavior alterations can be quickly passed on to persons who might be committed to 
executing attacks.  In addition, the flexibility of the Internet makes it easy to shut down web-sites and 
set up new ones to avoid detection.119   
 
B. Simultaneity 
The speed of Internet communication offers the prospect of connections across the globe,120 
enhancing ability to communicate operational information regarding terrorist activities.  Many violent 
networks are geographically dispersed.121  Transnational groups such as Kach, Hamas, and Al Qaeda 
                                                 
118 See Sunstein, supra note 108, at 432. 
119 See Wright, supra note 2, at 50 (noting that sites associated with Al Qaeda “move 
continuously... sometimes several times a day, to avoid being hacked by intelligence agencies or 
freelance Internet vigilantes... [webmasters of these sites] now cover themselves by stealing unguarded 
server space...”). 
120 See Hammack, supra note 102, at 81-86 (discussing synergies between terrorist operations 
and Internet). 
121 Cf. VIRILIO, supra note 87, at 12 (observing that drug traffickers in the United States have 
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raise money and recruit operatives on an international scale.122  Domestic networks such as extremist 
anti-abortion or white supremacist organizations also have members in far-flung locations.  The qualities 
of the internet make it perfect for such dispersed communication.  Participants in a network can log in 
from locations all over the map, and gain access to information more efficiently than is possible with 
traditional media. 
Complementing this notion of simultaneity is the Internet’s facilitation of asynchronous 
interactions.123  Visitors to a web-site need not communicate in real-time; instead they can send 
messages that will be read and responded to at the convenience of others, but without the transmission 
delays of older modes like “snail mail.”  The Internet also facilitates the automatic and user-accessible 
archiving of material awaiting the visitor’s attention.  Coupled with the Internet’s geographic reach, the 
temporal versatility of the Internet is a boon to terrorists.  
 
C. Benefits of the Internet for Democracy 
The simultaneity and absence of mediation on the Internet also have salutary consequences.  For 
example, the Internet’s speed and geographic reach can enable the connection of diasporated 
communities on a regional and global basis.  Consider here Edward Said’s account of Palestinian 
refugees in a camp on the West Bank setting up the “Across Borders Project,” which used the Internet 
                                                                                                                                                             
used technological innovations such as cell-phones to evade detection and apprehension). 
122 The September 11 attackers, for example, traveled to Afghanistan, later to Hamburg, and 
finally to a variety of sites all over the continental United States, from Florida to San Diego.  See 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 145-241. 
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to connect residents of the camp with residents of other Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, 
Syria, and Gaza.  The Project allowed residents to exchange views on important issues of relevance to 
the Palestinian community, such as the future of the peace process.124  One might not agree with all, or 
indeed any of the opinions articulated in such an exchange.  One can hardly gainsay, however, the value 
to ideals of political participation represented by this capability. 
Similarly, the Internet can provide intellectuals and activists with avenues to bypass the status 
quo-centered mediation offered by most mainstream media.  When major media offer privileged access 
to Bush Administration officials promoting an intervention in Iraq justified by faulty intelligence, 
intellectuals and activists can turn to the Internet to communicate an alternative vision.125  Some 
countries, including Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and the People’s Republic of China,126 restrict Internet 
access for their citizens out of fear of such alternatives.  The United States, however, should model a 
more robust commitment to democratic debate. 
 
D. Post-9/11 Challenges  
In an uncertain world, the interaction between fear of new technology like the Internet, and 
apprehension about newcomers to the United States, labeled as suspected terrorists, prompts 
distortions in First Amendment doctrine.  A cautionary approach to the Internet might increase the risk 
                                                                                                                                                             
123 See LESSIG, supra note 7, at 42-43 (2004). 
124 See EDWARD W. SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM  133-34 (2004).   
125 See id. at 132. 
126 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 178. 
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of a return to the bad tendency test, perhaps camouflaged in the rhetoric of content-neutrality.  A 
prosecution that resulted in the deportation of a Saudi national with a student visa, Sami Al-Hussayen, 
for coordinating extremist web-sites raises this concern,127 as do subsequent cases.128  Similarly, the 
post-September 11 climate may further incline courts and legislatures to curb the publication of 
information about terrorist tactics or scientific processes, even when this information contributes to 
public debate.  However, in this climate the use of the Internet by home-grown hate groups to intimidate 
opponents may not receive comparable attention, both because such groups do not fit the terrorist 
“profile” and because celebratory scholars may view the ubiquity of hate on the Internet as neutralizing 
the intimidation conveyed.  The potential result is the worst of all worlds, as skewed perceptions 
generate both over- and under-regulation.   
 
 IV. THE INTERNET, SPEECH, AND THE  
 LAW: A PARTICIPANT-CENTERED VIEW 
A contextual view that will both respect free speech and limit the use of the Internet to cause 
collective violence can help resolve this dilemma.  Meeting this need, a participant-centered view echoes 
                                                 
127 Al-Hussayen was acquitted of terrorism charges in June, 2004.  See No Conviction for 
Student in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A14.  He was subsequently deported. 
128 See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Terror Detainee is Seen as Leader in Plot by Qaeda, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at A1 (reporting on a number of arrests, including the arrest in London 
pursuant to a sealed federal warrant of Babar Ahmed, on charges stemming from his alleged use of 
United States websites and e-mail to solicit funds for terrorist causes).  Cf. Linda Fisher, Guilt By 
Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups., ARIZ. L. 




the position of thinkers and activists that participation in public discourse is a central value in a 
democracy.129  This view, developed here through the work of Louis Brandeis and Hannah Arendt, 
preserves participation against the totalizing force of the state, and the state’s tendency to stigmatize 
outsiders.  It identifies the practice of concerted violence not as an aspect of participation, but as an 
activity that undermines deliberation and discourse.  It also preserves private space as a refuge and 
respite from the rigors of participation, in the face of the Internet’s invasion of the private realm. 
 
A. Brandeis, Arendt, and the Theoretical Underpinnings of the Participant-Centered Approach 
Brandeis and Arendt reflect the focus of the participant-centered view on both engagement with 
and sanctuary from the public sphere.  Brandeis argued in his famous dissent in Whitney v. California 
that “the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government 
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary... the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people.”130  Similarly, for a civic republican theorist like Arendt, involvement in public discourse is 
                                                 
129 See STRUM , supra note 22, at 106 (noting that Brandeis agreed with accounts of Athenian 
democracy, which echoed his “the concern for justice and public affairs that had to exist for the 
protection of democracy”); Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 51, 94 
(1972) (noting that “consent and the right to dissent became the inspiring and organizing principles of 
action that taught... the ‘art of associating together’” to Americans); cf. Margulies, Tales of the 
Unexpected, supra note 21; Michelman, Law’s Republic, supra note 21; Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, supra note 21. 
130 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf.  
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM , supra note 5, at 47 (citing Brandeis’s concurrence); Blasi, supra note 22; 
at 668-80 (discussing Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney); Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: 
Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J. L. & POL. 451 (1988) (drawing 
parallels between Brandeis’s perspective and civic republican thought). 
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crucial to the realization of human potential.131  Through sharing stories in the public realm, human beings 
open themselves to the realm of the unexpected, acknowledging the contingency of their own prejudices 
and preconceptions.132  
While engagement in human governance is the highest goal or pursuit for a participation-
centered account, government exists in an ambivalent relationship with participation.  Government, 
properly understood, needs participation to develop new ideas and challenge old habits.  However, 
government officials often seek ways to domesticate or manage participation, robbing it of the alliance 
with the unexpected that makes it a central expression of what it means to be human.  Seeking to 
manipulate public opinion, governments frequently alter facts and massage the truth.133  Governments 
also seek to stigmatize dissenters, casting them as outsiders of questionable loyalty.  Brandeis, for 
example, feared that in times of crisis the simultaneity and unmediated nature of government repression – 
                                                 
131 MARGARET CANOVAN, HANNAH ARENDT: A REINTERPRETATION OF HER POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 111 (1992) (noting for Arendt, “what characteristically gathers and separates human beings 
is... the ‘public realm’”). 
132 See ARENDT, The Crisis in Education, supra note 23, at 17-74 (citing the “opportunity, 
provided by the very fact of crisis... to explore and inquire... [without] the answers on which we 
ordinarily rely”); ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 191 (noting “inherent 
unpredictability” of every body politic); Margulies, Tales of the Unexpected, supra note 21; cf. New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (praising 
experimentation, and noting importance of moving beyond preconceptions in world in which “the 
seemingly impossible sometimes happens”). 
133 See Arendt, Civil Disobedience, supra note 129, at 14(noting, with regard to government 
deception regarding Vietnam War brought to light by Pentagon Papers, that “the policy of lying was 
hardly ever aimed at the enemy... but was destined chiefly, if not exclusively, for domestic consumption, 
for propaganda at home, and especially for the purpose of deceiving Congress”). 
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fostered by “hysterical, unintelligent fear”134 – would distort democratic deliberation and chill or punish 
participation.   
To reinvigorate civic engagement, both Brandeis and Arendt looked to outsiders.  Both thinkers 
believed that immigrants strengthened democracy by bringing new ideas and renewed commitments.135  
Each identified the labor movement as a central engine of participation for the hitherto excluded and 
viewed repression of the movement as a danger to participation-centered ideals.136  Arendt also praised 
the role of the anti-war and civil rights movements of the 1960's in making the government 
accountable.137   
Although civic republican theorists’ insist on the need for dissent, they tend to view organized 
violence against others as undermining engagement.  For Arendt, violence reflects a homogenized 
viewpoint, certain of its conclusions, and focused too often on the mechanics of death and pain.138  Such 
                                                 
134 See RABBAN, supra note 40, at 361. 
135 See ARENDT, Crisis in Education, supra note 23, at 175 (arguing that immigration 
demonstrates that democracy in America “did not shut itself off from the outside world... in order to 
confront it with a perfect model,” but instead symbolizes a commitment to what Tocqueville called an 
“indefinite perfectibility”); STRUM , supra note 22, at 103 (arguing that working-class immigrants such as 
Jewish garment workers from Eastern Europe “possessed... qualities which we of the twentieth century 
seek to develop in our struggle for justice and democracy”). 
136 See RABBAN, supra note 40, at 358 (noting that Brandeis protested the harsh treatment by 
law enforcement authorities of members of the International Workers of the World (IWW) during a 
strike in Massachusetts, arguing that “citizens and aliens have, under the guise of administering or 
enforcement of the law, been denied civil rights”); ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 
219 (arguing that labor movement sought to “found... a new public space with new political standards”). 
137 See Arendt, Civil Disobedience, supra note 129, at 75. 
138 See id. at 105, 108-09 (deploring proliferation of strategic thinkers who plan war through 
“hypothetical constructions of future events... [in which] what first appears as a hypothesis... turns 
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a view corrodes the commitment to transparency – to letting a concept be seen from all perspectives139 
– that animates participation.  Violence inevitably skews discourse among both perpetrators and 
survivors, creating habits of insularity and fear that inspire further destruction.140   
The participant-centered account also argues that private forces can undermine democracy and 
engagement as severely as a repressive government.  Indeed, under the participant-centered account, 
there is often a continuum between repressive private and public forces.  For Brandeis, of course, 
corporate power was a profound threat to civic engagement and accountability.141  Arendt also 
lamented the rise of corporate power as displacing the public realm.142  In addition, Arendt devoted 
substantial attention to charting the rise of polarized private groups, such as the Nazis and Fascists, who 
used violence and intimidation to take over governments, converting them into repressive and sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                             
immediately... into a “fact,” which then gives birth to a whole string of similar non-facts”); ARENDT, 
HUMAND CONDITION, supra note 21, at 202-03 (arguing that tyrants who seek to rule by violence 
inevitably fail because they seek to substitute force for the power that emerges from the “human 
capacity to act and speak together”); RABBAN, supra note 40, at 359 (discussing Brandeis’s rejection 
of the goals of the IWW and other radical groups which incorporated violence into their approach). 
139 See ARENDT, The Concept of History, supra note 22, at 227, 242 (noting that in 
participation in political discourse, “a particular issue is forced into the open that it may show itself from 
all sides, in every possible perspective”). 
140 See Arendt, Civil Disobedience, supra note 129, at 154 (noting that a totalitarian 
government comprised of former revolutionaries “turns not only against its enemies but against its friends 
and supporters as well... the police state begins to devour its own children... [and] yesterday’s 
executioner becomes today’s victim”). 
141 See MCCRAW, supra note 31, at 94-97 (discussing Brandeis’s campaign against the trusts). 
142 See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 126-35 (discussing adverse effects on 
participation of the rise of “consumer society”).  The critique of consumerism is also crucial for 




genocidal regimes.143   
As a bastion against oppression, civic republicans also value a zone of privacy.  For Brandeis, a 
space “to be let alone”144 ensured the flourishing of each person’s “spiritual nature, of his feelings and 
intellect.”145  It also ensured the vitality of the public sphere, since the “intensity and complexity”146 of 
engagement in public matters required periodic opportunities for “retreat from the world.”147  Arendt for 
her part wrote powerfully about the need for a “place of one’s own.”148  For Arendt, this space “offers 
the only reliable hiding place from the common public world.”149  Without this sanctuary, public 
engagement becomes “shallow” and trivial.150 
The participant-centered view argues that modern media such as the Internet can frustrate 
                                                 
143 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM  364-73 (1975) (discussing 
dynamics of totalitarian movements aspiring to state control, including commitment to paramilitary 
capability, iteration of core images and narratives, and shunning of engagement with opposing views). 
144 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193, 195 (citing Judge Thomas Cooley); cf. 
EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
STATES 80-82 (2002) (discussing Brandeis’s conception of privacy). 
145 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193.   
146 Id. at 196. 
147 Id.  Cf. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989) (describing privacy as contributing to discourse 
within community); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 651 (1991) (arguing that for Brandeis, normative 
conception of privacy reflected the “respect that we owe to each other as members of a common 
community”). 
148 ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 70. 
149 Id. at 71. 
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participation by destroying privacy.  Brandeis was concerned that the virtually “instantaneous” speed of 
modern “inventions... business methods... [and] mechanical devices” would “invade[ ] the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life.”151  Arendt described the corrosive effects of the exposure of 
private persons to the ministrations of mass media, observing that, “[f]ame penetrates the four walls, 
invading their private space, bringing with it... the merciless glare of the public realm, which floods 
everything in the lives of those concerned.”152  In addition to these direct effects, the marketing of 
unmediated trivialities about personal affairs would crowd out matters of genuine public importance,153 
undermining more difficult but necessary discourse and confirming people’s pre-packaged opinions.154 
Even more ominously, for Brandeis and Arendt, emerging technology spawns more intrusive 
government methods of surveillance, such as the wire-tapping that Brandeis criticized as an 
unreasonable search and seizure in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States.155  Technological 
advances might ultimately offer the government clandestine access to “the most intimate occurrences of 
                                                                                                                                                             
150 Id. 
151 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 195. 
152 See ARENDT, The Crisis in Education, supra note 23, at 186. 
153 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 196. 
154 Arendt agreed that the consumer society’s thirst for triviality could crowd out civic discourse, 
noting that European monarchs at the threshold of the modern era had drained the political vitality of 
potential rivals by expanding the circle of nobles attending the monarch, and “making them entertain one 
another through the intrigues, cabals, and endless gossip which this perpetual party inevitably 
engendered.”  See HANNAH ARENDT, The Crisis in Culture, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 
197, 199 (1977). 
155 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). 
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the home,”156 and to “unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions,”157 enabling government to more 
tightly manage the people’s unruly urge to participate.  Technology could enable the government to 
more effectively dominate discourse, leveraging new media and techniques of persuasion to obscure or 
erase inconvenient facts about the world.158   
However, the participant-centered view would also value the countervailing capability that 
technology offers for dissenters.  In this vein, Arendt noted that governmental attempts to erase the past 
will fail so long as government cannot “wield power over the libraries and archives of all countries of the 
earth.”159  The virtually limitless archives of the Internet thus mediate the government’s attempts to 
achieve dominion over data, sustaining alternative resources for participation.  In addition, the 
decentralized spaces created by the Internet have the potential to generate new kinds of civic interaction 
                                                 
156 Id. at 474.  Brandeis’s papers indicate that he viewed television, a medium barely past the 
experimental stage at the time Olmstead was decided, as a potential “means of espionage” that might 
allow future governments to reproduce in court documents covertly viewed in home offices without the 
resident’s knowledge or consent.  See STRUM , supra note 22, at 137. 
157 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474. 
158 See ARENDT, The Concept of History, supra note 22, at 89 (predicting that “social 
techniques... have only to overcome a certain time-lag to be able to do for the world of human relations 
and human affairs as much as has already been done for the world of human artifacts” by earlier 
technology); ARENDT, Lying in Politics, supra note 133, at 7-12 (in the context of revelations in the 
“Pentagon Papers” about United States officials’ deception regarding war in Vietnam, discussing 
manipulation practiced by “public-relations managers in government,” along with “problem-solvers” who 
turned to reductive versions of social science explanation to rid themselves of reality’s “disconcerting 
contingency”) (emphasis in original). 
159 See ARENDT, Lying in Politics, supra note 133, at 13 (discussing the ultimate futility of 
Stalin’s effort to “eliminate Trotsky’s role from the history of the Russian Revolution” by killing Trotsky 
and “eliminating his name from all Russian records”). 
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and fresh perspectives on perennial problems.160 
The participant-centered model also captures the two central elements of concern about the 
Internet: lack of mediation and simultaneity.  Those acting as agents of terrorist organizations or 
operations are not only far less susceptible to mediation, but more committed to preventing others with 
whom they interact from obtaining access to mediated views.161  This is the danger of conspiracy and 
agreement that has typically made such operational terrorist “networks” unprotected under the First 
                                                 
160 See ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 21, at 198 (noting that Greeks’ observation 
that, “Wherever you go, you will be a polis... expressed the conviction that action and speech create a 
space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere”).  For 
Brandeis, decentralization was equally important to innovation and liberty.  See New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing states as 
“laboratories” of federalism); Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 340 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring that federal 
courts defer to state law in diversity cases).  For recent elaborations of Brandeis’s theme of 
decentralization promoting experimentation and refinements in the ordering of liberty, see Michael C. 
Dorf, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1998) (citing Brandeis); 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 267 (1998) (discussing constitutional basis for enhancing accountability and flexibility of 
government); cf. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First 
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 175-77 (1995) (discussing Brandeis as pragmatist who rejected 
formalist solutions). 
161 Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 17, at 419-20; cf. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 
169-80 (discussing structure of terrorist groups); Sunstein, Social Dynamics, supra note __ (same);  
Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2003) 
(arguing that rigid  intractable beliefs of terrorist operatives may make them “undeterrable”); see also 
Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 57-65 (describing conspiracies as involving “situation-altering utterances” 
that bind individuals to illegal course of conduct and mute countervailing influences); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (discussing psychological and organizational 
theory undergirding criminalization of criminal agreements).  Because of this structural intractability, the 
familiar Brandeisian remedy of “more speech” will be far less effective.  Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that “more speech” is best remedy for 
extreme views); HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 65, at 204 (discussing Holmes’s move, in part 
due to discussions with Brandeis,  toward “more speech” approach); see also supra notes 67-71 and 
accompanying text (discussing Holmes’s shift in Abrams). 
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Amendment.  Simultaneity is important in the privacy context, where non-public persons can be 
intimidated by the Internet transmission of continuously updated information accessible to network 
members that have a track record of violence directed against such private persons.  The power of this 
threat potentially serves to intimidate people into silence, disabling the “more speech” antidote outlined 
by Brandeis in Whitney.   
The participant-centered view protects participants in public discourse, including those 
participants testing or exceeding the limits of polite discussion.  However, the participant-centered view 
denies protection to willful participation in agreements or conspiracies that set the stage for escalating 
violence.  The absence of a “more speech” antidote shuts down mediating mechanisms for such 
participants.  At the same time, the participant-centered view protects individuals engaged in high-risk 
activities deemed important to democratic life, including witnesses in high-profile criminal trials and 
persons engaged in vindicating reproductive rights.  By attaching special protection to certain roles 
important for democratic participation, and simultaneously depriving protection to roles that chill the 
participation of others, a participant-centered view emphasizes the social nature of both protected and 
unprotected activities.162 
                                                 
162 Other commentators have emphasized participation in their accounts of the First 
Amendment.  See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM , supra note 5; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 190-
92; Balkin, supra note 86; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
1411-12 (1986).  Some commentators cite participation as a function of individual autonomy.  Cf. Post, 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 167 (offering 
“participatory perspective [that] emphasizes the autonomy of individual citizens”); C. Edwin Baker, 
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).  This view runs 
the risk of slighting the interests of the audience for speech, as well as the role of some Internet 
communication in facilitating violence.  On the other hand, Sunstein, perhaps the contemporary legal 




B. A Taxonomy of Speech and Conduct 
An initial step in a participant-centered approach is to identify three different ways in which 
speech can facilitate violence by terrorist groups or institutions in the Internet context.  This analysis sets 
out three modes of crime-facilitating speech or communication: information and affiliation, mobilization, 
and operation.  It acknowledges, however, that these categories are unstable.  Moreover, certain 
mainstays of typical First Amendment analysis, such as the requirement that harm be imminent to 
criminalize speech that is otherwise protected and the general view that First Amendment protection 
attaches to a greater degree to public rather than private speech,163 do not necessarily hold true in the 
context of the Internet and terrorism.   
A participant-centered view accords affiliational and informational speech the highest level of 
protection.  This speech involves a statement of political support for a particular group or cause, no 
matter how abhorrent to the majority, or a description of a group, event, or thing in the world.  The 
modern First Amendment generally protects abstract calls for violence captured in either the affiliational 
or informational mode, as in, “I support the overthrow of the United States government,” or, “X 
                                                                                                                                                             
positive role of extreme speech in focusing attention on inequality.  See Sunstein, Why They Hate Us, 
supra note 108 (discussing organizational dynamics as basis for terrorism, while neglecting role of 
perceptions of inequality as catalyst for violence); cf. Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 
395 (arguing that both organizational structure and inequality are important to understanding and 
addressing terrorism).  The account offered here, in some ways more indebted to Greenawalt’s careful 
treatment of the interaction of speech and crime, see Greenawalt, supra note 8, and strives for a more 
balanced approach regarding the impact on democracy and terrorism of changes in communications 
technology. 
163 See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 117-18. 
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supports the use of force to effectuate the revolution.”  Such statements, however extreme, are tied to 
participation in public discourse, as long as they retain a general focus.  Speech of this kind would 
include on-line discussions of the status of violent jihad in Islamic doctrine.164 
Extreme speech warrants protection because of its strong ontological and pragmatic links to 
ideals of participation.165  Such speech may be an element of a learning process for participants, who 
may test extreme rhetoric, and then determine that it does not meet their needs.  Extreme rhetoric can 
also serve as an outlet for dissent, and as an indication of vulnerabilities for regimes that may then 
undertake reform.166  Similarly, the participant-centered approach would generally protect reports about 
world events, such as newspaper accounts of speeches by leaders of alleged terrorist groups, as serving 
similar functions.  Moreover, a government with the power to deter or punish such statements of 
affiliation or information may use its power broadly to stifle all disagreement and target disfavored 
groups, chilling civic involvement.167  As indicated previously, this is the theory underlying the “bad 
tendency” test and the broad interpretation of “clear and present danger,” as endorsed by the Dennis 
Court.   
In some cases, however, speech couched in the language of information or opinion may be 
operational in intent or effect.  Operational communications involve commands, agreements, 
                                                 
164 See Abu Khubayb & Abu Zubayr, Greater and ‘Lesser’ Jihad?, supra note 116. 
165 See Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 3. 
166 See Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT, supra note 52, at 121, 132. 
167 See POSNER, supra note 52, at 131. 
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solicitations, or threats to perform illegal acts.  Such acts, particularly those that involve violence, reflect 
a shift away from participation in civic discourse and a subsequent move toward conduct that is either 
largely self-interested or focused on undermining the participation of others. 
History reveals that leaders of violent organizations often use the language of opinion or 
information to authorize violence.  Sometimes an authorization may come in the form of a question, as 
when Henry II of England asked, “Will no one rid me from this turbulent priest?”168  Henry’s select 
audience of nobles responded with the murder of Thomas à Becket.  More recent leaders of violent 
organizations have cast extortion and intimidation as the simple supply of information, tendering data 
about an offer their interlocutor “cannot refuse.”  For example, an alleged Mafia boss on trial in New 
York resorted to the language of opinion, averring that he “would like to leave a receipt” for targets of 
his displeasure; those targets soon found themselves migrating to settings of higher (or lower) 
altitudes.169   
While most of the above examples concern individual targets, leaders of organizations with the 
capacity and inclination to practice violence may also have designs on collective targets.  For example, 
leaders of such networks may target members of particular ethnic, religious, national, or even 
                                                 
168 Theodor Meron, Crimes and Accountability in Shakespeare, 92 AM . J. INT’L L. 1, 20 
(1998). 
169 See William Glaberson, Prosecutor Ridicules Idea of Mob Boss as Pacifist, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2004, B3 (reporting on testimony at trial of alleged mob boss Joseph Massino).  At a higher 
pay-grade, President George W. Bush and high officials of his administration, despite their subsequent 
disavowals, sent signals about toleration of mistreatment of detainees in Iraq when they offered their 
opinions that international law was unduly restrictive or irrelevant.  See Anthony Lewis, Making 
Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BKS., July 15, 2004, at 4 (discussing development of the Administration’s 
legal position, which disregarded both treaties and applicable precedent). 
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occupational groups, such as Palestinians on the West Bank,170 Jews in Israel,171 Tutsis in Rwanda,172 
or doctors performing abortions in the United States.173  Here, too, leaders may couch their directives in 
terms of opinion or metaphor, noting, for example, that “the gates of resistance are open totally.”174  
What separates such expressions from mere statements of opinion or sentiment is their context: the 
organizational structure of the group and its pattern or practice of violent acts suggests that the audience 
for the remarks consists of members of the group who view the expressions not as opinions, but as 
operational instructions.175   
                                                 
170 See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 102 (describing machine-gun attack by militant Israeli 
settlers, pursuant to “specific approval and sanction of their own clerical authorities,” on Islamic students 
at college on West Bank, which killed three and wounded thirty-five). 
171 Id. at 99 (discussing attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinian group Hamas). 
172 See TILLY, supra note 114. 
173 See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 119-20. 
174 A key political leader of Hamas acknowledged that he used this phrase to trigger suicide 
bombings.  See Joel Brinkley, Arabs’ Grief in Bethlehem, Bombers’ Gloating in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 4, 2002, A1; cf. Elaine Sciolino, Moroccan Connection Is Emerging as Sleeper in Terror War, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, sec. 1, p. 1 (noting that comment such as “soccer team is ready” can be a 
trigger for illegal operations).  Government evidence about use of code, public or private, by terrorist 
organizations, should be particularized and concrete to justify restrictions on communication.  See 
Margulies, Virtues of Solidarity, supra note 16, at 207-10 (discussing problems with attorney-client 
monitoring policy implemented by Attorney General Ashcroft); Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, 
Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting 
Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145 (2004) (same). 
175 See United States v. Abdel Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding 
conviction for conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks and commit other acts of violence 
despite defendant’s contention that he was merely stating his opinion within bounds of First Amendment; 
evidence allowed the jury to infer that defendant’s communications constituted direction to act).  This 
operational link separates the examples discussed in the text from the abstract discussions of violence 
protected under Brandenburg.  However, fully addressing such operational speech in the terrorism 
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In the context of Internet-driven collective violence, the public expression of the authorization 
and the occasional time lag between the authorization and subsequent violence do not vitiate the 
operational character of the remarks.176  The asynchronous nature of Internet time allows operatives to 
readily gain access to material on web-sites at their convenience.  An operative who is inaccessible 
during the “real-time” delivery of the authorization of violence can readily pick up the thread at a 
subsequent point.  Imminence also seems to be irrelevant where, as in the case of September 11, 
terrorist operations can take months or years of planning.177  From an anti-terrorist policy point of view, 
the relevant issue is the ongoing capability of the terrorist organization to plan and execute violence once 
authorized, not the time period between the authorization and the completed act.   
The structure of violent networks also undermines the rationale for the protection of public 
speech.  In the collective violence context, victims are fungible, targeted because of group 
characteristics such as race or ethnicity rather than individual identity.178  Authenticity entrepreneurs can 
                                                                                                                                                             
context requires some modification of Brandenburg’s imminence requirement, as well as the 
presumption that public speech is protected.  Cf. infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. 
176 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 76 (2002) 
(noting Al Qaeda operatives’ use of encrypted e-mail communications). 
177 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2; Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men: 
Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, in HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? 1, 9 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon 
Rose eds., 2001) (discussing planning of September 11 attacks). 
178 See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 1010 (noting that Rabbi Meir Kahane “openly called upon 
the Israeli government to establish an official ‘Jewish terrorist group’ whose sole purpose would be to 
‘kill Arabs and drive them out of Israel and the Occupied Territories’”).  See generally PHILIP B. 
HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
99 (1998) (“speeches or writings by charismatic leaders urging political violence can provide the 
battering ram of encouragement a potential terrorist needs to take himself past the wall of social 
condemnation to a willingness to commit violent acts”); HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 94 (“Religion... 
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deliver instructions to commence targeting such fungible victims more efficiently in public than in 
private.179  Committed or prospective perpetrators may also view directives on a web-site as more 
authoritative than dissemination in a more private medium, whether someone’s living room or a chat 
room on the Internet.  Moreover, in an area such as Rwanda, which in the 1990's approached a 
“tipping point” of violence as a result of authorizations and collective appeals by “authenticity 
entrepreneurs,” perpetrators may also be fungible, deciding to commit violence because of opportunity 
rather than a long pedigree of commitment to the cause.180   Finally, when operatives are committed but 
dispersed and compartmentalized to promote secrecy, a broad public authorization is a useful starting 
point for planning.  Once an authenticity entrepreneur issues a directive, planning can proceed in a more 
covert fashion, with the secret and homogenous structure of the organization shutting out mediating 
views. 
Threats offer yet another context in which abstract justifications of violence can combine with 
specific, personal information about possible targets of violence to generate a message that, viewed as a 
whole, is operational.  In such a case, a participant-centered approach would consider the impact of 
such hybrid speech on the participation of targets, as well as speakers.  The participant-centered 
approach, therefore, is inherently reciprocal, protecting the communication of those who do not 
                                                                                                                                                             
imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine – therefore serves as a legitimizing force. 
 This explains why clerical sanction is so important to religious terrorists and why religious figures are 
often required to ‘bless’ (i.e., approve or sanction) terrorist operations before they are executed”). 
179 Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 118 n. 52 (noting that precautions often possible in 
response to public speech are not practicable in case where “racist speaker urged members of his 
audience to kill a member of another race, at random”). 
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materially interfere with the ability of others to speak.   
Moving beyond these categories, communication can also entail the mobilization of infrastructure 
for future illegal activity.  Mobilizing activity stops short of operational action’s direct link to violence, 
instead building an organization’s resources and capabilities.  For example, a person may seek to collect 
money in order to hand it over to a transnational network such as Al Qaeda, whose track record of 
violence has resulted in its designation as a terrorist organization.  Such an individual might also 
knowingly manage a web-site on Al-Qaeda’s behalf,181 or contribute to a violent network’s inventory of 
information about security measures and vulnerabilities of possible terrorist targets, knowing that such 
information will aid the network in making final target selections.182   
Courts generally regard such mobilization as appropriately prohibited by government, as long as 
the limits are carefully tailored to avoid direct regulation of protected speech.183  Under this analysis, 
Congress can prohibit raising cash for a transnational organization with a recent track record of 
violence, because the transnational and horizontally integrated nature of the group makes it difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                             
180 See TILLY, supra note 114, at 34; Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 395-96. 
181 See Amy Waldman & Salman Masood, Elaborate Qaeda Network Hid 2 Captives in 
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A10 (noting capture of Muhammed Naeem Noor Khan, a 
computer engineer who worked with Al Qaeda in “an elaborate network for transmitting messages 
across Pakistan and then posting them in coded e-mail messages or on the Web”). 
182 See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Reports That Led to Terror Alert Were Years Old, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, A1 (discussing discovery of detailed information apparently 
compiled by Al Qaeda operatives about security arrangements at United States and global financial 
institutions). 
183 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133-36 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. 
den. sub nom Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). 
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ensure that money goes only to nonviolent activities.184  Congress cannot, however, prohibit pure 
affiliational or informational speech in support of the group’s ends or means.  Nevertheless, as we shall 
see in the next section, distinguishing between protected affiliational or informational statements and 
mobilizing conduct is not always easy, creating the risk that regulating mobilization will become a back-
channel method for restricting content and singling out marginalized groups such as immigrants.   
In sum, each of these categories, including affiliational, informational, operational, and 
mobilizational speech, bleed into each other.  While each category has paradigm cases where consensus 
is plausible, at the margins overlaps and ambiguities persist.  To consider how the participant-centered 
approach assists in sorting out those ambiguities, consider the examples in Part V.   
 
V. THE PARTICIPANT-CENTERED APPROACH IN PRACTICE: THREE EXAMPLES 
Ambiguities between state power and civil liberties may be a permanent legacy of September 
11.  Cyberspace has more than its share of such uncertain boundaries.  Legal issues surround the 
                                                 
184 Id. at 1136 (noting difficulties in accounting for money distributed transnationally, and 
asserting that some ostensibly nonviolent activities, such as special support for the families of suicide 
bombers, also aid and abet violence); cf. Margulies, Virtues and Vices of Solidarity, supra note 16, at 
200-07 (same); Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment, supra note 
110, at 329-30 (same).  Even scholars who argue, with some justification, that the mobilization rationale 
is overbroad concede that Congress could prohibit fund-raising for groups, such as Al Qaeda, “so 
committed to violence that all other activities are merely a front for terrorism.”  See COLE, supra note 
17, at 62.  This concession begs the question of who decides which groups meet the standard.  As an 
institutional matter, courts may not be the optimal forum to assess the degree of transnational 
organizations’ commitment to violence.  See U.S. v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1051-52 (C.D. 
Ca. 2002) (holding that appropriateness of designation of group as terrorist organization is political 
question, while holding that the procedures surrounding the designation must meet due process 
requirements for notice and an opportunity to be heard); see infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text 
(proposing limits on mobilization rationale as basis for culpability). 
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prohibition of Internet-based “material support” to terrorist organizations and conspiracies, the 
publication on the Web of terrorist manuals or scientific processes, and the use of the Internet to 
circulate “true threats” against groups such as abortion providers.    
 
A. Material Support 
The participant-centered approach helps to clarify some problems associated with conduct on 
the Internet that might violate the prohibition on “material support” of a designated terrorist organization 
(DFTO)185 or terrorist conspiracy.186  The material support prohibitions are an example of government 
                                                 
185 See 18 U.S.C. 2339B.  Material support includes funding, training, “expert advice or 
assistance”, “communications equipment”, “personnel”, “transportation”, and “other physical assets.” 
See 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b) (2002).   Funding includes “currency or monetary interests in financial 
securities...  [and] financial services”.  Id.  Material support also includes “lodging, ...  false 
documentation or identification, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, [and] explosives”.  The USA 
Patriot Act added the “expert advice or assistance” category in 2001.  A number of courts have held 
that some of these terms are unconstitutionally vague as applied, see, e.g., United States v. Sattar, 272 
F. Supp.2d 348, 357-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that “personnel” and “communications equipment” 
were unconstitutionally vague as applied); cf. COLE, supra note17, at 75-79 (arguing that statute on its 
face violates First Amendment); Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention 
Paradigm: The Guilty By Association Critique (Review Essay), 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1433-51 
(2003) (discussing material support statute, and arguing that certain terms, such as “personnel,” are 
unconstitutionally vague in the sec. 2339B context); but see Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of 
Solidarity, supra note 16, at 203-07 (arguing that provisions are not vague as applied to facts of 
Sattar, where government charged defendants with knowingly acting on behalf of a designated terrorist 
organization in order to facilitate violent acts). 
186 See 18 U.S.C. 2339A (prohibiting material support to conspiracies to commit specific 
violent crimes, such as a conspiracy to kill or kidnap persons in a foreign country, prohibited by 18 
U.S.C. sec. 956); cf. United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 296-303 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(holding, when government filed superseding indictment under sec. 2339A after dismissal of charges 
brought under 2339B on vagueness grounds, that 2339A prohibitions, because they referred to specific 
crimes, were not unconstitutionally vague); cf. Chesney, supra note 185 (discussing differences 
between sections 2339A and B). 
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regulation that imposes incidental burdens on speech in the interest of regulating conduct.  Too broad an 
interpretation of “material support” on the Internet could recapitulate the sorry history of the bad 
tendency test in a more neutral guise.187  Applying the participant-centered view, however, offers an exit 
from this difficulty.   
 
1. Incidental Burdens Generally 
Permitting government to impose incidental burdens on speech in the course of vindicating 
substantial government interests is both necessary and dangerous.  As a general matter, incidental 
burdens analysis holds that the government can regulate conduct related to free speech when: (1) such 
regulation is content-neutral; (2) the regulation serves an important governmental interest; and (3) the 
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the interest.188  Without some ability to impose incidental 
burdens, government itself would become impossible.189  However, the incidental burdens test, which is 
less demanding on government than the test for content-based speech, leaves open a back-door for 
government efforts to control speech.190 
                                                 
187 Cf. Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM . & MARY 
L. REV. 2209, 2236-60 (2003) (discussing political and institutional factors that tend to broaden the 
scope of criminal liability under federal statutes); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, 
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 799-801 (2003) (discussing institutional 
incentives of prosecutors and other law enforcement officials); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001) (discussing convergence of interests 
between legislators and prosecutors that broadens scope of criminal law). 
188 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
189 See Dorf, supra note 15. 
190 See id. (criticizing implementation of test as unduly deferential); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
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This problem with the incidental burdens test is emphasized in the leading Supreme Court 
decision, United States v. O’Brien.191  In O’Brien, the Court upheld a statute passed at the height of 
protests against the Vietnam War which criminalized burning one’s draft card.  The Court asserted that 
the government was merely trying to vindicate its interest in an orderly draft system.  For the Court, the 
system would become disorderly if registrants for the draft or draft-eligible individuals could destroy 
their draft cards.  For the Court, therefore, the statute was a narrowly tailored vehicle for serving a 
significant government interest.  According to the Court, since the statute was indifferent to any political 
view that an individual might seek to express in burning his draft card, simply penalizing the conduct 
itself, the statute was content-neutral. 
The same analysis figures in the more recent case of Universal City Studios v. Corley.192  In 
Corley, the Second Circuit upheld the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that 
prohibited the distribution of software that had the ability to defeat use and reproduction restrictions on 
digital products licensed for sale.  The court reasoned that the DMCA does not directly impinge on 
speech, since it does not restrict persons from criticizing the restrictions contained in licensing 
agreements, but simply promotes enforcement of those agreements.  Thus, according to the Corley 
court, the DMCA is a reasonable and narrowly tailored vehicle for promoting intellectual property 
rights.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775-78 (2001) (questioning coherence of incidental 
burdens analysis). 
191 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
192 Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Commentators have vigorously criticized both O’Brien and Corley as requiring far less tailoring 
than the incidental burdens test seems to contemplate.  In O’Brien, for example, commentators have 
noted that Congress had already enacted measures requiring that registrants for the draft have their draft 
card in their possession.193  The government did not demonstrate that these pre-existing provisions were 
inadequate to safeguard the government’s interests.  Moreover, commentators assert that the timing of 
the statute’s enactment, after the start of protests against the Vietnam War, strongly suggests that the 
statute was designed to suppress speech, and was therefore not content-neutral.  
Similarly, commentators have argued that Corley did not take into account that the use 
restrictions at issue had little relevance to the goal of preventing unauthorized duplication.194  Moreover, 
these commentators have in effect argued that the DMCA was not content-neutral, since it took sides 
between those arguing for corporate intellectual property rights, and consumers arguing for preserving 
fair use rights.195  In addition, the Court’s invocations of simultaneity proved too much – if the software 
was already widely available, enforcing the statute against the hackers would not effectively serve a 
government interest196 and would merely suppress hackers’ efforts to encourage corporations to build a 
better, more responsive business model. 
                                                 
193 See GREENAWALT, supra note 15, at 328-31; Dorf, supra note 15, at 1202-05. 
194 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4. 
195 Cf. Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The New Software Jurisprudence and the Faltering First 
Amendment, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 310, 316-18 (2004) (criticizing incidental burdens analysis 
in Corley). 
196 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App.4th 241, 251 (Ct. App. 6th App. 




2. Material Support, the Internet, and the First Amendment 
Transported to the law and terrorism arena, material support concerns frame the analysis of the 
recent prosecution of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a Saudi national studying computer science at the 
University of Idaho.  Al-Hussayen was arrested with great fanfare in early 2003 and charged with 
providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorist groups.  According to the government, 
the defendant provided “expert advice or assistance” by using his computer and Internet skills to set up 
a web-site for a group later designated as a terrorist organization, which also included a link to a web-
site tied to the Palestinian DFTO organization Hamas.197  Al-Hussayen also posted accounts and audio 
files of speeches by radical Saudi clerics to his site, to chat rooms, and to e-mail lists.198  The 
government did not allege and presented no evidence that Al-Hussayen actually collected money for the 
purpose of conveying funds to Hamas, or held himself out as an agent of Hamas for this purpose.  
Indeed, the government never alleged that Al-Hussayen worked for Hamas at all.  However, the 
government alleged that Al-Hussayen specifically intended to provide material support to Hamas and 
other terrorist organizations. 
                                                 
197 According to the government in its indictment, Al-Hussayen helped “create, operate, and 
maintain” a website, www.islamway.com, that “included links to a variety of articles, speeches, and 
lectures promoting violent jihad in Israel.”  On this site, according to the indictment, a page asked 
visitors the question, “What is your role?,” answered by urging visitors to contribute to Hamas, and 
provided a hyperlink to another site, www.palestine-info.org, to permit donations to Hamas.  See 
United States v. Al-Hussayen, Cr. No. 03-0048-C-EJL (D. Idaho March, 2004) (hereinafter Al-
Hussayen Indictment), at 8.   
198 See id. at 9 (alleging that a February, 2000 posting by the defendant urged members of the 
group to “donate money to support those who were participating in violent jihad”). 
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While a jury ultimately acquitted Al-Hussayen of the material support charges,199 Al-Hussayen’s 
victory was of limited value to the defendant.  Al-Hussayen’s family left the country, and Al-Hussayen 
was himself imprisoned for over a year pending trial (during which time he continued to work on his 
degree from his jail cell), before he was subsequently deported.200  The government was able to 
proceed to trial in the case, confining Al-Hussayen for a year, because specific intent is virtually always 
a triable issue.  Because the government continues to bring other material support cases involving the 
Internet,201 now is an appropriate time for considering whether the specific intent standard in Internet 
material support cases is sufficiently speech-protective.  
The Al-Hussayen prosecution illustrates the risk that the material support prohibition will 
become the contemporary equivalent of the content-based regulation the courts permitted in the World 
War I cases like Schenck.  One of the government’s recent theories was in effect the mirror image of 
Schenck: while Schenck sent direct mail to inductees, allegedly with the intent of persuading them not to 
serve, Al-Hussayen sent material on-line to persons interested in Islamic issues, allegedly with the 
specific intent of encouraging them to participate in terrorist training camps or contribute funds to 
terrorist organizations.   
Despite the premise of judicial decisions upholding the material support statute as being content-
neutral, the government’s theories nevertheless focused on the content of the material conveyed on-line 
                                                 
199 No Conviction for Student in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, A14. 
200 See Saudi Acquitted in Terror Case is Deported, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2004, A14. 
201 See Jehl & Johnston, Terror Detainee is Seen as Leader in Plot by Al Qaueda, supra 
note 128, at A9. 
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by the defendant.  A statement such as, “I support Hamas and I urge everyone on this list to support it 
monetarily and otherwise,” reflects an opinion (praise of Hamas) and advocacy of an abstract course of 
action (financial or other support) that should receive First Amendment protection.  Prosecution for 
Internet speech under the material support statute in this context, far from merely imposing incidental 
burdens on speech, constitutes a de facto content-based classification. Permitting such law enforcement 
action also encourages the profiling of particular groups the government associates with terrorism, 
including immigrants of the Muslim faith.  Moreover, prosecutions of this kind unduly discount the 
efficacy of mediation, such as the deterrent value of prohibiting the actual provision of material support 
in the form of financial assistance or other resources.  Unfortunately, the court in the Al-Hussayen case 
failed to rule on the issue, thereby posing no obstacles to future government use of the material support 
statute for this purpose.  
To avoid the risk of a rebirth of the bad tendency test, courts presiding over material support 
prosecutions involving Internet communications should require a showing that the defendant acted as an 
agent for a specific terrorist organization, or as a participant in a conspiracy to commit a specific 
terrorist act.  To be an agent in this context, a defendant charged with material support of a designated 
terrorist organization would have to reach an express or implied agreement with decisionmakers within 
the organization to seek resources on the organization’s behalf.  Agency could involve a defendant 
holding himself out as collecting money or other resources for the organization, offering advice to 
prospective contributors on laundering contributions to avoid detection, or providing resources such as 
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website management directly to the organization – actions that can subsidize or facilitate violence.202  
Proof of such activity moves the speaker’s conduct squarely into the operational or mobilizational realm, 
minimizing the chances that the material support prohibition will be used to chill affiliation or information-
seeking.203 
                                                 
202 See Margulies, Virtues and Vices of Solidarity, supra note 16, at 203-07 (noting that 
providing human capital, such as expertise with information technology, directly to DFTO is analogous 
to providing financial capital, given integrated nature of organization and organization’s ability to use 
human capital to defray other costs); see generally Chesney, supra note 185 (acknowledging that 
Congress could criminalize financial contributions and certain forms of human capital such as specific 
instruction in use of explosives, while arguing that criminalizing other forms of human capital triggers 
vagueness concerns); supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing case law and commentary on 
integrated structure of terrorist organizations). 
203 Posting or linking should require similar evidence.  Suppose a defendant designs a website 
and includes a link to the official website of Hamas or Kach.  Once linked to the DFTO website, a 
visitor can click on another link to receive information about contributing financial assistance or other 
resources to the organization, or possibly even contribute on-line.  Despite this, criminalizing provision of 
the link without more would raise substantial constitutional problems, because of its impact on the 
provision of information or the expression of affiliation.  For example, an anti-terrorist organization could 
include the link to offer visitors to its site an opportunity to see for themselves the nature of the material 
on the DFTO site.  Others who merely seek to express their affiliation with the DFTO could link for that 
purpose.  For this reason, even proof of specific intent to encourage contributions should be insufficient, 
without evidence that the defendant acted in concert with the organization.  Cf. Comcast of Illinois X, 
L.L.C. v. Hightech Electronics, Inc., No. 03-C-3231, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14619, *18  (N.D. Ill. 
stet 2004) (holding that plaintiff, cable operator, stated a claim for relief by alleging that defendant 
received compensation for links to websites that sold illegal pirating devices); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. 
v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that liability for 
links to websites containing copyright-infringing material would not attach absent proof of “direct 
relationship” between defendant and individuals operating websites); with Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 456 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding injunction on posting code that circumvented 
user-restrictions or linking to sites containing code if defendant knew offending material was on site, 
knew material was illegal, and acted with purpose of disseminating code); cf. Shady Records, Inc. v. 
Source Enterprises, No. 03 Civ. 9944, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10511, slip op. at 10-12 (S.D.N.Y. 
stet 2004) (holding defendant magazine in contempt for violating court order that required removal of 
links on magazine’s website to complete lyrics of song by rapper Eminem). 
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Courts have often used a comparable approach to determine liability in cases involving speech 
facilitating violation of the tax laws.  These cases mirror material support cases like Sami Al-Hussayen’s 
– in the tax context, defendants allegedly seek to deprive the government of lawful revenue, while in the 
material support context, defendants allegedly seek to provide revenue to unlawful organizations.  In tax 
cases, courts have held that the First Amendment protects defendants who support the position that tax 
laws are unfair and that persons therefore are morally justified in violating them.204  Courts have often 
looked for some indicia of collusive activity between the speaker and the audience, including concrete 
assistance in the filing of fraudulent tax returns.205 
In the tax context, such collusive behavior lends an operational tone to the speaker’s conduct, 
removing it from the realm of affiliation or information.  Specific collaboration between the speaker and 
the audience raises particular concerns about simultaneity and the absence of mediation.  A visitor to a 
DFTO or tax-evasion website that receives concrete advice is far more likely to quickly make the 
                                                 
204 See United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
generalized instructions to an audience on how to violate the tax code, along with advocating for tax 
shelter scheme that was not clearly illegal at the time of the conduct, are protected). 
205 See United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1978) (to establish culpability for 
aiding and abetting filing of fraudulent tax return, defendant would have to “in some sort associate 
himself with the venture” in a specific manner); United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 807 (7th Cir. 
2000) (defendant negotiated with individuals interested in purchase of defendant’s set of tax violation 
materials, selling materials for as much as $2,600; many purchasers subsequently engaged in violation of 
the tax laws); cf. United States v. Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d 1093, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(arguing that extent of defendant’s participation in tax violations committed by others was factor in 
issuance of injunction against “plan or arrangement” to furnish statements in tax return pursuant to 26 
U.S.C.§ 6700); United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 626-30 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2004) (employing 
commercial speech analysis to justify enjoining defendants who expressed protected anti-tax views in 
book but also used book to market deceptive products on website). 
 
 66 
decision to go forward with a specific violation, having been enabled with operational guidance 
facilitating such conduct.  Similarly, the agreement between the speaker and the audience member 
makes it far less likely that other countervailing influences, including the general deterrence provided by 
law, will interfere with the audience member’s plans, or that the government will learn of the illegal 
activity.  Furthermore, such concerted activity gives the speaker a stake in the transaction, making it 
more likely that he or she will take further actions to ensure the success of the particular mode of illegal 
conduct.206  
The above analysis would have resulted in the dismissal of the charges against Al-Hussayen, but 
would have permitted prosecution to go forward in United States v. Sattar.207  In Sattar, the 
government charged three individuals with violating the material support prohibition by seeking to secure 
the approval of an incarcerated terrorist leader, Sheikh Abdel-Rahman, for the Internet posting of a 
decree urging members of the Sheikh’s organization to kill Americans and Jews.208  The organization 
had been designated by the government as a terrorist organization after the leader was convicted of 
participating in a conspiracy to commit numerous acts of violence within the United States.209  The 
                                                 
206 Conduct of this kind strongly resembles what Kent Greenawalt calls “situation-altering 
utterances.” See GREENAWALT, supra note 15, at 244-45 (noting that individualized training for illegal 
activities should not constitute protected speech). 
207 United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
208 Id. at 291. 
209 See United States v. Abdel Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 109-17  (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding 
conviction of defendants under federal seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 2384, for inter alia, 
conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks such as the Holland Tunnel).  Members of the group, 
in an avowed attempt to gain the leader’s release, engaged in a massacre of more than sixty people at a 
tourist site in Luxor, Egypt.  See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing Luxor attack); Douglas 
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group later declared a “cease-fire.”  The co-defendants allegedly sought to procure the jailed leader’s 
approval of the fatwah and its subsequent posting on the Internet to disrupt the cease-fire and turn the 
group back toward violence. 
If it is true, as the government alleges, that the Sattar defendants attempted to place the 
incarcerated leader of the organization back in the “loop” in order to direct future violent acts, the 
defendants went beyond the realm of information and statements of affiliation into the operational realm 
of conspiracy.210  Although the fatwah was couched in the semantic frame of opinion, the recent history 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jehl, 70 Die in Attack at Egypt Temple, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A1 (same).  The defendants 
in Sattar include defense attorney Lynne Stewart and others working for Stewart, who allegedly used 
their access to the Sheikh as his legal representatives to facilitate communications about future violent 
activities.  Cf. Margulies, Virtues and Vices of Solidarity, supra note 16, at 194 (arguing that if 
allegations are true, Stewart “crossed the line” separating advocate from accomplice and merited 
prosecution).  Stewart is mounting a vigorous defense.  See Justice for Lynne Stewart, at 
http://lynnestewart.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
210 A fatwah like the one allegedly endorsed by Sheikh Abdel Rahman authorizing the killing of 
Jews “wherever they are,” or a “death sentence” distributed on the Internet regarding a group or an 
individual, should be reachable by the law despite its arguably public nature and lack of demonstrable 
imminence.  See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.  Often, such authorizations have direct 
links with subsequent violent operations.  See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 97 (noting that persons 
responsible for first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 “specifically obtained a fatwa from Sheikh 
Omar Abdel Rahman... before planning their attack”).  Where the government has designated a group 
as a terrorist organization through a statutory process, restrictions on the communication of potential 
incitements can also fit a counter-mobilization rationale, constituting legal attempts to disrupt terrorists’ 
communications networks.  In this sense, a bar on intra-organization communications about proposed 
violent activity is akin to a bar on the receipt or collection of funds, or on the provision of 
communications equipment to organization members.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a) (setting activities that 
constitute material support).  Since the law could appropriately prohibit an individual from lending the 
incarcerated leader of the organization a disposable cell-phone on which to make calls to organizational 
operatives, see Chesney, supra note 185; it could also prohibit a visitor to the leader from acting as a 
communications link that gives the leader input from subordinates and allows him to offer instructions. 
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and the statement’s particular wording suggested otherwise.211  The evidence that the Sattar defendants 
acted in concert with the organization’s leader on the organization’s behalf and with knowledge of the 
organization’s structure and practice distinguishes the Sattar case from the independent informational 
activities engaged in by Al-Hussayen.  The participant-centered approach’s focus on context thus holds 
decisionmakers in organizations accountable for statements that are the operational predicates for 
violent acts, while simultaneously protecting independent participants in civic discourse who merely offer 
information or express their affiliation, no matter how extreme. 
 
                                                 
211 Organizations with recent histories of violence may in some cases exhibit a more 
heterogeneous, mediated discourse.  Indeed, there is some evidence that this is true of the organization 
involved in the Sattar case, the Gama Islamiya or Islamic Group (IG).  See Lawyer denies Islamic 
Group has withdrawn backing for peace, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 24, 2000 
(quoting Egyptian lawyer for faction of Islamic Group as disputing report that Sheikh Abdel Rahman 
had withdrawn his support for the cease-fire).  However, in such cases members of the group 
committed to violence may splinter off, forming a new group that complies with the leader’s decrees.  
Groups committed to violence need not be numerous to be deadly, as the nineteen September 11 
hijackers demonstrated.   
The issue of change in terrorist organizations such as IG is nonetheless a difficult one not 
adequately addressed in current United States anti-terrorism law.  I have suggested elsewhere that 
designated terrorist organizations have the opportunity to apply for “transition relief,” a remedy akin to 
bankruptcy that would allow the organization to wipe the slate clean and chart a non-violent course in 
the future.  A mechanism for affording such relief to organizations that demonstrate a transition to non-
violence would strengthen incentives for positive change.  See Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 
17, at 410.  Effective anti-terrorism policy also requires assistance to grass-roots groups abroad that 
support non-violent reform.  Id. at 411-12; cf. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 
1399, 1433-57 (2003) (noting role of women’s groups in working within framework of Islamic culture 
and society); Janine A. Clark & Jillian Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women’s Activism in 
Islamist Parties, 35 COMP. POL. 293 (2003) (same); see also Heiner Bielefeldt, “Western” Versus 
“Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion of 
Human Rights, 28 POL. THEORY 90, 109-12 (2000) (noting diversity and nuance as well as common 
ground within cross-cultural conceptions of human rights); Volpp, supra note 17, at 1592-98 (same). 
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B. Disclosing Tactics, Techniques, and Scientific Methods  
The participation-centered approach also argues for greater protection for the on-line 
publication of terrorist techniques and scientific methods.  Disclosure of such material may lead to 
greater citizen involvement and more vigorous debate.  Moreover, the arguments against such 
participation are likely to be highly skewed variants of the simultaneity and unmediated risk claims that 
our jurisprudence has rightly rejected in the core area of political speech. 
To explore this argument in the Internet and terrorism setting, it is useful to return to Universal 
City Studios v. Corley,212 in which the court enjoined a website’s posting of computer code that 
enabled website visitors to play DVDs on Linux computers.  Although the code had been written by 
hackers without knowledge of or participation in the work that produced the use restriction, the court 
validated the recording industry’s vague argument that the use restriction also discouraged piracy.213  
The Corley court’s deference to the recording industry was particularly troubling in light of the First 
Amendment value of the code in question.  
In the DVD cases, the on-line availability of techniques that may aid illegal conduct is important 
to alert society that such knowledge is available, and therefore to encourage business organizations 
seeking to benefit from copyright-protective technologies to better equip themselves to compete in the 
                                                 
212 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 455 (2d Cir. 2001). 
213 Id. at 454-55; see VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 70 (“it would be hard to show that 
hacking through [the user restriction] CSS... contributes to piracy or peer-to-peer distribution for one 
simple yet often ignored reason: CSS regulates access and compatibility, not copying.  Anyone can 




marketplace of ideas.  One way to deal with music or movie piracy, for example, would be to create a 
user-friendly alternative to peer-to-peer networks.  Corporations that avoid devising such alternatives, 
because of reliance on a technological lock-down, are relying on short-term fixes, instead of considering 
long-term values.214   
A consideration of the First Amendment value of the DVD-hacking code in the Internet context 
also makes short work of the mediation and simultaneity claims.  While a code that penetrated copyright 
restrictions on software would allow individuals to make unauthorized copies, software manufacturers 
have a range of mediative strategies at their disposal.  As suggested in the preceding paragraph, 
mediation may be indirect, taking the form of attractive alternative technologies devised and marketed 
by the manufacturers themselves.  In addition, if manufacturers wish to retain the option of coercive 
measures, they can institute legal actions against end-users to deter piracy.  Indeed, manufacturers have 
pursued a combination of these two mediative strategies because the simultaneity argument, irrespective 
of legal results, cuts so clearly against them as a matter of business planning.  Once software of such 
general interest is on the Internet, putting the genie back in the bottle is all but impossible.215  If the goal 
                                                 
214 See LESSIG, supra note 7; see also Tom Zeller, Jr., Permissions on Digital Media Drives 
Scholars to Lawbooks, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2004, at C4 (describing travails of Prof. Edward Felten 
of Princeton, who was subjected to threats of a lawsuit over publication of a paper analyzing 
technologies to secure music files online). 
215 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 253 (Cal. Ct. App.  
2004) (arguing that injunction would be unavailing in Internet intellectual property case because of 
widespread circulation of decryption code); see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 71-72 
(author notes that, “Within days of the injunction [in Corley], T-shirts appeared with the [decryption] 
code emblazoned on them (with the headline, ‘I am a circumvention device.’). People wrote poems and 




of suppressing speech is to bar access to information, legal efforts to cope with the simultaneity of the 
Internet will literally fail before they begin.216  The global reach of the Internet compounds the futility of 
legal intervention in such cases.  
Armed with analysis from the software piracy context, we can investigate how these issues play 
out regarding two areas important for law and terrorism: disclosure of terrorist tactics and scientific 
processes for the formation of weapons of mass destruction.   
Internet publication of detailed instructions for terrorists on assassinations, extortion, and the 
like, inevitably give rise to justified public apprehensions about the impact of these violent acts.  Yet 
here, as in the context of extremist speech, current legal tests based on specific intent may not provide 
adequate protection for speech.  Consider the example of “Hit Man,”217 a detailed guide for hired killers 
published in hard-copy form as well as on the Internet.218  Because the publisher stipulated for purposes 
of summary judgment that it intended that the materials be used by actual or aspiring hit-men, a court 
awarded damages to victims of killings where the killer apparently used the book.219  It was clear, 
however, that there was no actual or knowing participation in the killings by the book’s author or 
                                                 
216 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004) (noting that courts below failed to 
consider rate of change of technology on Internet); Lee, supra note 94, at 1307-08 (same). 
217 Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 235-40, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying summary 
judgment to publisher). 
218 See Rex Ferel, Hit Man Online: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, at 
http://ftp.die.net/mirror/hitman (last visited Aug. 20, 2004). 
219 Cf. PHILIP B. HEYMAN, TERRORISM , FREEDOME, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 
108 (Mit. Pr 2003) (citing Paladin for principle that “constitutional protections... may not prevent 
criminalizing the dissemination of information intended to help others in committing a crime by, for 




While the “Hit-Man” decision has its proponents,221 it is troubling because of the guide’s First 
Amendment value as well as the court’s failure to think through the issues of simultaneity and mediation. 
 The book’s value, like that of a Jihad manual for terrorists-in-training, is in illustrating the vulnerabilities 
of our current system, and the ease with which a lawbreaker can operate with impunity.222  The Hit-
Man and Jihad materials also offer useful insights into the psychological dynamics of the individuals who 
embark on such a violent course of action, thus allowing participants in civic debates to learn about the 
                                                 
220 In this sense, the “Hit-Man” case and the Jihad manual are different from the cases on the 
publishing of tax avoidance schemes.  In most of the tax schemes, see United States v. Schiff, 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16351 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2004), the defendants have engaged in some degree of 
interaction with the persons who may use defendants’ products or materials to file fraudulent returns.  
See United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2000); cases cited supra notes  204-06 
and accompanying text.  In Schiff, for example, the defendant wrote a book arguing that the 
administration of the tax laws was unfair and unconstitutional, suggesting that taxpayers enter “zero” as 
the amount of income to be taxed, regardless of the money the taxpayer had actually earned.  In 
upholding an injunction against the defendant’s continued sale of his book on his website, 
http://www.paynoincometax.com , and a requirement that the defendant post the injunction on his site, 
the court noted that the defendant also marketed packets and kits on the site that purport to assist 
taxpayers in legally paying no taxes.  (The website items include a “Lien and Levy Packet” priced at 
$95.00 that offers similar tax advice.)  The site allows visitors to e-mail the defendant.  Cf. David Cay 
Johnston, Federal Grand Jury Indicts Protester for Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at 
C8 (reporting that Schiff and co-defendants were charged with tax evasion and conspiracy to commit 
tax fraud based on Schiff’s alleged failure to declare $3.7 million in sales from his bookstore, 
defendants’ use of offshore accounts to conceal income and assets, and defendants’ preparation of at 
least 4,950 returns falsely declaring zero income).  Applying a commercial speech rationale, the court 
held that while Schiff’s book contained protected speech about the tax system, viewed in its totality it 
served as a marketing tool for the deceptive products Schiff sold on his website.  The interactivity and 
integrated nature of Schiff’s enterprise distinguish the case from Paladin. 
221 See Rodney Smolla, From Hit Man to Encyclopedia of Jihad: How to Distinguish 
Freedom of Speech from Terrorist Training,  22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 479 (2002). 
222 The Justice Department has placed an alleged Al Qaeda training manual on the Internet.  See 
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homogeneity of thought and selective moral concern of terrorist groups223 as well as democratic 
counter-examples that value diversity.   
In the Hit-Man and Jihad manual context, our assessment of simultaneity and mediation is likely 
to be skewed by our apprehension of the events described in the materials.224  First, consider mediation. 
 If short-term punitive fixes are available against those who distribute such information, we may unduly 
discount the impact of longer-term mediative strategies, such as policy alternatives that promote global 
equality and thereby blunt the recruiting of new terrorist operatives.225  Such alternatives will not always 
work, particularly given the polarized discourse within violent networks and the small number of people 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2004). 
223 See Kanan Makiya & Hassan Mneimneh, Manual for a ‘Raid’, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
Jan. 17, 2002, at 18, 20 (discussing Al Qaeda training manuals’ targeting of population centers). 
224 See Steven J. Sherman, et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived 
Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 98, 101 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & 
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (noting that images that are readily available to human cognition, such as 
a disease with readily identifiable symptoms, raise assessments of probability of contracting disease even 
in the absence of objective evidence); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional 
versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES, supra, at 19, 22-25 (noting that judgments about representativeness, defined as superficial 
similarity between events, raise probability assessment); see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 114 
(discussing “availability cascades” as influence on public policy); see also Matthew Rabin, Psychology and 
Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT . 11, 30-31 (1998) (discussing importance of salience in human inference); see 
also ROSEN, supra note 57at 75 (discussing cognitive biases in war on terror); see also Oren Gross, 
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 
1011, 1019 (2003) (same); cf. Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me that ?": Attorney-Client 
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L. REV. 213, 232-
34 (1990) (discussing cognitive biases in lawyering). 
225 See Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 17, at 404-19 (discussing approaches, such as 




required to create catastrophic damage.  However, legal rules should nonetheless encourage such 
options.226   
Analysis of simultaneity leads to the same conclusion.  As the World War I cases demonstrate, 
combustibility is a powerful metaphor for the language of incitement, shaping not only views of an event 
itself, but also assessments of communications perceived as related to the event.227  People often 
attribute the same speed and sudden impact characteristic of a catastrophic event, such as an explosion, 
to abstract speech advocating or describing illegal conduct perceived as related to the catastrophe.  
These connections, however, are far less clear in practice.  Putting together a terrorist operation or a hit 
requires elaborate planning, as the September 11 hijackers demonstrated.  Groups with the structure 
and control over their members required for such planning also generally have the resources for 
                                                 
226 The legal system also has coercive strategies currently available when necessary, including 
military action when required by self-defense, cf. William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted 
Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679-80 (2003) 
(discussing “customary constitutional authority” for exigent measures based on self-defense); see 
Richard Falk, Ends and Means: Defining a Just War, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2001, at 11, 12 
(justifying American resort to force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by arguing that Al Qaeda is 
a “transnational actor... [whose] relationship to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan [was]... contingent, 
with Al Qaeda being more the sponsor of the state rather than the other way around”), prosecution of 
individuals actually committing or conspiring to commit terrorist criminal acts, see United States v. 
Sattar, 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 296-303 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (upholding charges under 18 U.S.C. sec. 
2339A against vagueness challenge), and detention of alleged unlawful combatants with appropriate 
procedural safeguards; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that presumptive 
United States citizen detained as alleged enemy combatant was entitled to procedural protections such 
as right to be heard and right to counsel); see also Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (finding 
federal jurisdiction under habeas statute to hear petitions of alleged Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base); cf. Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 17, at 417-31 (discussing due process in 
detention of alleged unlawful combatants). 
227 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 224. 
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developing and distributing their own proprietary tactical materials.  Even when, as apparently occurred 
in the “Hit Man” case, a perpetrator draws inspiration and data from published materials, these materials 
often duplicate other materials already available.228  Given the simultaneity of the Internet, attempts to 
stop the flow of information qua information will merely inspire an endless virtual fun-house of mirror 
sites.229 
While on the surface, information about scientific processes may be more technical than 
information regarding terrorist tactics, the same analysis ultimately applies.230  Benefiting from a formula 
for poison gas or a nuclear device, for example, requires the cultivation of a body of knowledge and 
professional judgment, as well as the resources to build and maintain a physical plant for the 
manufacture and distribution of the weapon.  Developing the expertise and the infrastructure to exploit 
that formula thus “demands a significant investment of time and money.”231  Persons with sufficient skills 
and resources to exploit the formula are unlikely to need the published formula to do their work.  
                                                 
228 For example, the material on secrecy in the “Hit Man” manual, which boils down to a generic 
“Trust no one, especially women,” see “Hit Man” supra note 218, largely duplicates the advice in the Al 
Qaeda Training Manual, supra note 222.   
229 See “Hit Man” manual, supra note 218. 
230 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining  
publication of formula for hydrogen bomb); cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931) 
(dicta asserting that courts could enjoin disclosure of movements of military transports or “number and 
location of troops”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that First 
Amendment barred injunction against publication of Pentagon Papers which detailed course of United 
States involvement in Vietnam). 
231 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 4, at 132; but see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating 
Speech, at http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/facilitating.pdf (conceding difficulties of developing 
infrastructure to exploit information about weapons of mass destruction, but arguing that government can 
nonetheless prohibit publication of such information). 
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Similarly, persons lacking such expertise cannot benefit from the formula even it is published on the 
Internet or elsewhere.232   
Moreover, similar to the Hit-Man and Jihad manual circumstances, democratic governments 
have mediative measures available in the scientific process context as well.  Persons with scientific 
expertise who act as agents of terrorist groups to enhance those groups’ destructive capacities can be 
prosecuted under a mobilization rationale.233  So can persons who donate substantial sums of money to 
terrorist organizations – money that can be used to purchase the services of persons with such expertise. 
 Similarly, a participant-centered rationale would allow legal recourse against an individual who 
discloses information gained through participation in proprietary research, or those who induce such a 
disclosure, since these actions undermine participation in the research process.  Absent evidence of such 
participation, the legal system should not criminalize or enjoin on-line publication of tactics, techniques, 
or scientific methods.234 
                                                 
232 But see S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost 
of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1225 (2000) 
(arguing that law and policy would justify criminalizing publication of bomb-making recipe by 
Unabomber); cf. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of 
Ideas and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273 (2003) (analyzing issues concerning 
the extent to which criminal liability can be imposed for the dissemination of certain types of speech). 
233 See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text. 
234 See POSNER, supra note 52, at 361 (arguing that pragmatic application of First Amendment 
principles would permit prohibition on “disseminating a truthful formula for making poison gas”); cf. 
IGNATIEFF, supra note 114, at 161-62 (arguing for carefully tailored regulation of distribution of 
scientific data).  On the other hand, courts should strongly consider constitutional protection for 
independent individuals who obtain information through methods that the law formerly considered fair 
use, such as “reverse engineering” of software.  See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital 





While the participation-centered approach offers heightened protection in dealing with incidental 
burdens and disclosure of terrorist tactics and scientific methods, it argues for minimal protection of the 
provision of personal information in a threatening context over the Internet.  Here too, however, 
categories are murky.  Material that intimidates can also inform.  The participant-centered approach 
resolves issues by focusing on participation not only by speakers, but also by the targets of speech. 
In a democratic society, threats are punishable not because they necessarily lead to physical 
violence, but because they deter participation in a broad range of activities.  Despite the focus on 
immigrants that has historically tainted antiterror efforts,235 many of the most serious threats to 
participation in American political discourse are home-grown.  The extortion practiced by organized 
crime is punishable because it affects people engaged in a broad range of commercial activities 
beneficial to society, either forcing people out of these activities or “offering” them the possibility of 
staying in business if they pay a tax to the offeror.   Practitioners of collective violence such as the Ku 
                                                                                                                                                             
Beacon for Fair Use Analysis... At Least As Far As It Goes, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1131, 1160-63 
(1994) (discussing reverse engineering as fair use).  While licensing agreements for software often 
prohibit reverse engineering, this process often resembles a venerable independent pursuit such as taking 
apart a car engine much more than it resembles free-riding or exploiting access to information gleaned 
through work sponsored by the putative owner of the intellectual property at issue.  Cf. Weiser, supra 
note 4, at 547-49 (discussing reverse engineering).  Treating both courses of conduct as actionable 
extends the ambit of intellectual property into areas of independent inquiry appropriately reserved for 
First Amendment protection.  See LESSIG, supra note 7.   




Klux Klan also use fear to stifle participation.236  If victims of such intimidation seek to inform the 
authorities, the organization in question retaliates.  In this fashion, threats deter the important civic duty 
of holding wrongdoers accountable.  Participation withers, and alienation takes its place.237  The result is 
the corruption of ordinary democratic processes by practitioners of violence.238 
Threats occur not merely expressly, but also implicitly, sometimes in conjunction with proffers of 
information.  Context, including justifications for violence, a recent pattern of violence directed at the 
target group, and specific information about the group, are important.239   For example, symbolic speech 
such as cross-burning on the property of a member of the target group, combined with the Klan’s 
historic justifications for and pattern of violence, sends a powerful message about that target’s 
vulnerability.240  In perhaps a more controversial case, the Ninth Circuit held that the “Nuremberg Files” 
                                                 
236 Cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing Klan 
as “terrorist organization, which, in its endeavors to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses 
the most brutal of methods”). 
237 See ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM , supra note 143, at 344-45 (noting that 
Nazi campaign of assassination of political opponents, along with their public claiming of responsibility,  
“attempted to prove to the population the dangers involved in mere membership” of groups opposing 
Nazis, and  “made clear to the population.... that the power of the Nazis was greater than that of the 
authorities;” also noting “[t]he similarities between this kind of terror and plain gangsterism”). 
238 Threats against a public figure, such as the President, have a similar result, by raising the 
specter that private agendas or obsessions can frustrate the will of the people expressed through the 
electoral process. 
239 In the appropriate context, a statement such as, “We know where you live,” may be a 
powerful threat, because it suggests that the speaker has access to information about the subject that 
renders the subject vulnerable and has a motivation for exploiting that vulnerability.   
240 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (history of cross-burning provides satisfies 
objective test required for verbal or symbolic action to constitute true threat). 
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website that identified individual doctors performing abortions as mass-murderers, labeleded them as 
“wanted,” and placed a line through the names of doctors that had been murdered, constituted a “true 
threat” which was subject to injunction.241  Thus, a website that fails to express an overt threat may 
nonetheless tender a true threat if the context demonstrates that the designers of the website intend to 
intimidate a person or persons.242 
The Internet is a singularly useful medium for such intimidation.  Traditional media will typically 
decline to carry such information because of safety or taste concerns.243  In addition, the simultaneity of 
the Internet, which dispenses with the “lead time” of any other medium, presents a greater intrusion on 
people targeted and gives them less opportunity to make adjustments to promote safety.  Updates and 
                                                 
241 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the maker of the communications could 
reasonably foresee that the subject of the descriptions would interpret them as a “serious expression of 
intent to harm.”  See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), 290 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that circulating “Wanted Posters” of doctors who performed abortions and 
posting their names on web site entitled the “Nuremberg Files” constituted “true threat” outside ambit of 
First Amendment). 
242 On the other hand, courts will not use true threat doctrine to stifle the dissemination of 
information, including some personal information, when that information facilitates political participation, 
such as peaceful protest of perceived law enforcement overreaching.  See Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. 
Supp.2d 1135, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding unconstitutional statute that barred distribution of 
home address or phone number of law enforcement or judicial employees “with intent to harm or 
intimidate,” regardless of whether a reasonable person would view herself as threatened by such 
disclosure, in case where operator of website calling for law enforcement accountability called solely for 
lawful protest and had no record of violent action); cf. Gov’t Attempts Subpoena for Indymedia Logs 
– Service Provider Refuses, at http://www.indymedia.org (last viewed Aug. 30, 2004) (discussing 
government efforts to acquire information regarding activist group’s posting of personal information 
about delegates to Republican National Convention). 
243 See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM , supra note 5; supra note 117 and accompanying text; cf. 
Brenner, supra note 232, at 383 (noting that operator of website dedicating to stalking targets can 
readily include photographs or video of victim). 
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revisions of rapidly-changing information are routine on the Internet.  If targets change their schedules, 
addresses, or other personal information, the site’s webmaster can post the new information on the site 
virtually immediately.  Because threats constitute attempts to intimidate others, courts should view them 
as inherently operational, and not subject to the constraints on regulation of information and affiliation 
under the First Amendment.  A hate group’s “death sentence” can reach intending and aspiring 
“executioners” most efficiently through the Internet.244  The capabilities of the Internet support the 
argument that a punishable threat should not require distinct proof of collaboration with persons who will 
attempt to carry out the threat because violence need not be a certainty in order to deter listeners’ 
participation.  Given a context of violence, potential victims should not be required to guess whether a 
person making a threat of violence that seems clear in its intent to intimidate has the connections or 
resources to carry out that threat.  Indeed, even in cases where there is no express interaction between 
the speaker and those individuals with the means and propensity to carry out the speaker’s threat, the 
fear sparked by uttering the threat may be amplified when related violent actions have already occurred. 
 Leveraging violence in this fashion is not a form of political participation, but rather a rejection of the 
premises of the participatory model.245   If the threat, in itself, would intimidate a reasonable person, 
                                                 
244 See Steven Lee Myers, A Russian Fighting Hate is Killed in Hate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2004, at A7 (discussing murder of Russian researcher on hate groups, who had aided the police in law 
enforcement efforts focusing on “how the language [these groups] used... on the Internet constituted 
incitement to ethnically motivated violence;” website had published a letter (apparently appearing only 
after victim’s death, although dated prior to his murder) imposing a “death sentence” on the victim); cf. 
Brenner, supra note 232 (noting Internet’s ability to direct “diffuse” groups held together by common 
interests rather than geographic location); Hammack, supra note 102 (same). 
245 Speakers who leverage violence in this fashion and subsequently cite the First Amendment to 
frustrate accountability are free riders who contribute little to political debate but seek to derive 
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such a threat is a sufficient basis for culpability.246     
                                                                                                                                                             
advantage from constitutional commitments.  In contrast to the contribution made by persons who utter 
extreme or outrageous opinions and thereby question mainstream assumptions, cf. Robert Post, 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, 
supra note 3, at 153, 168-70 (viewing speaker’s experience of participation as crucial, while also 
acknowledging more instrumental notion of contribution to self-government), speakers who leverage a 
history of violence for purposes of intimidation practice a particularly cynical brand of what Frederick 
Schauer has called “First Amendment opportunism.”  See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment 
Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 3, at 175, 196-97.  Of course, all constitutional 
commitments engender some free riding.  Id. at 191-92.  However, this is not a valid objection to 
attempts to limit free riding, but merely an indication that courts must ensure that such limits are narrowly 
tailored. 
246 See GREENAWALT, supra note 15, at 252 (whether a threat is criminal “does not depend on 
whether the speaker actually intends to carry out the threat; it is sufficient that he intentionally lead the 
listener to think that he will carry out the threat”).  See also Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition 
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that culpability for true threat does 
not depend on ability to execute threat).  Some courts have required more specific evidence of the 
speaker’s capacity and inclination to make good on the threat as proof of the reasonableness of the 
target’s apprehension.  See United States v. Kelner, 545 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Steven G. Gey, 
The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 590 
(2000) (arguing that speaker’s communication of “intent to carry out the threat personally” is crucial to 
definition of true threat); Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 289 (2001) (same).   
Just as material not cast as a threat in semantic terms can be threatening in context, context may 
indicate that material that constitutes a threat in semantic terms should not trigger liability.  See NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 
708 (1969) (court held that Vietnam war protester who in course of speech at rally said, “I have got to 
report for my physical [pursuant to the draft] this Monday... I am not going.  If they ever make me carry 
a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” was not making threat but engaging in “very 
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President”).  Context can also help 
determine the nature of the speaker’s intent.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365-66 (2003) 
(noting that state can criminalize cross-burning directed at individuals, but not cross-burning not so 
directed, for example, cross-burning at rally or on motion-picture lot).   
Judges and commentators have argued vigorously that the “Nuremberg Files” case burdens free 
speech, because the defendants were expressing views on abortion, an issue in the public arena.  See 
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829; cf. C. Edwin Baker, Harm, 
 
 82 
In addition, persons making on-line threats should not be able to cite the presence of other 
protected material on a site as a means for evading accountability.  Some of the material on the 
“Nuremberg Files” site, such as the general characterization of doctors performing abortions as 
murderers and war criminals, clearly reflects protected social and political views.  However, anti-
abortion extremists have ample means available for expressing such sentiments that do not contain 
personal information about specific doctors.247  Because of the wide availability of alternatives, a rule 
imposing criminal or civil liability for implicit threats does not unreasonably burden the participation of 
the speaker.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 990-92 (1997) (arguing that attempts to hold 
speakers accountable for harm done by others unduly discount autonomy interest of speaker in 
articulating her values, as well as “mental mediation” provided by actual perpetrator who responds to 
speaker).  The counter-argument here, as in the case of tax resistance advocacy coupled with 
commercial speech, see United States v. Schiff, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16351 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 
2004), is that the speaker can readily separate protected expressions of affiliation from offending 
conduct.  This is true even when the conduct at issue involves a  category of speech, such as threats or 
criminal agreements.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361-62 (2003) (“When the basis of content 
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason that entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no 
significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists”); cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 393 (1992) (“content [of fighting words] embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially 
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey”).  To pass First 
Amendment muster, the court must narrowly tailor its definition of the prohibited category and analyze 
context with care.  See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982) (finding that 
remarks of community leader, viewed in context, were threats of community ostracism protected by 
First Amendment, not proscribable threats of violence); Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy, supra note 231, at 1108-09 (noting that public remarks threatening social ostracism or 
disapproval are integral to robust social and political debate and therefore constitute protected speech). 
   
247 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willlamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing importance of context for in evaluating a 
threat to the speaker). 
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To illustrate how true threat doctrine might apply to the Internet, consider a recent series of 
events involving a government witness in the trial of prominent white supremacist Matthew Hale for 
soliciting the murder of a federal judge.  Witness Tony Evola’s testimony led to Hale’s conviction.248  A 
website sympathetic to Hale excoriated the witness, publishing the home phone and address of an 
individual who happened to share the witness’s name, but was in fact an entirely different person.249  
Previously, one of Hale’s followers had gone on a homicidal rampage in connection with an earlier legal 
defeat for Hale, killing two people.250  Meanwhile, a radio host of an avowedly “eugenics-based” 
broadcast dedicated to propagating conceptions of racial superiority gave out information about the 
website, “In case anyone wants to say hi.”251   
In the climate of violence engendered by the Hale case, intimidation of the kind noted above 
goes beyond threats of social ostracism, and leverages fear of physical harm in order to chill 
participation in the legal system.  Responding to the threat, the participant-centered account would have 
supported an injunction and a claim for damages against the offending website and against the radio 
host, had the host continued to encourage his listeners to commit violence.  Criminal liability under a 
carefully drafted statute that bars intimidation of witnesses may also have been appropriate, along with 
                                                 
248 See John Kass, Hale Supporters Confused About Whom to Hate, CHI. TRIB., April 28, 
2004, at C2. 
249 Id. 
250 See Matt O’Connor, Officials Monitor Hate Talk on Web, Backlash Feared on Hale 
Verdict, CHI. TRIB., April 28, 2004, at C1.   
251 See id. 
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tailored intervention with Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) to limit the publication of the material.252  
Legal authority to regulate threats should not simultaneously regulate the independent disclosure 
of lawfully obtained personal information.253  The presence of the intent to intimidate distinguishes the 
personal information revealed in the above discussion from the personal information revealed in cases 
such as the Kobe Bryant prosecution.  In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court enjoined news media 
outlets from publishing information that they had received in an erroneous electronic transmission 
containing information about the complainant and recent motions concerning the scope of Colorado’s 
                                                 
252 My attempts to secure Internet access to the sites with the erroneous information about the 
witness turned up Internet addresses that were apparently unavailable at the time of the search.  An ISP 
that on its own or because of government intervention stops publication of an on-line threat provides a 
narrowly crafted source of mediation that is consistent with the participation-centered approach.  
Connoisseurs of the political and social opinions advanced on sites that publish threats should not 
despair of the availability of alternative fora.  See, e.g., www.gentileworld.com (last visited Aug. 10, 
2004) (noting and critiquing world dominance by Jews); 
www.whitestruggle.net/Kosher_Konspiracy.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (same).  
253 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 5 (arguing that some measures ensuring privacy in cyberspace 
serve interests of democratic participation); Solove, supra note 5 (same); with Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1108-09 (2000) (arguing that asserting 
link between privacy and democratic participation could justify overbroad regulation of otherwise 
protected speech).  The nature and alienability of an individual’s interest in privacy of personal data has 
inspired an extensive literature.  See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004) (arguing for regulated market in personal data); Pamela Samuelson, 
Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000) (arguing for market system for 
personal data, but asserting that property rights are too rigid for this purpose); but see Anita L. Allen, 
Coercing Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999) (arguing for some level of inalienability with 
respect to personal data, on grounds that law should not allow people to sacrifice fundamental aspects 
of personhood); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (same).   
 
 85 
“rape shield” law.254  In the order issuing the injunction, the Colorado Supreme Court sought to 
distinguish two significant United States Supreme Court cases that had struck down measures 
prohibiting or creating liability for disclosure of personal information about parties in criminal cases.255   
Despite the Colorado Supreme Court’s efforts in the Kobe Bryant case, the information about 
the complainant, obtained without wrongdoing on the media outlet’s part, seems to fall squarely within 
the First Amendment ambit established by Supreme Court precedent.  The scope of the rape shield law 
is a significant matter of public concern.256  Material in the motion papers could enhance and refine 
debate about future interpretation of the statute.  That interest in participation should be outweighed only 
by evidence that the media obtained the evidence through participation in illegal conduct such as bribery 
or theft.257  
 
                                                 
254 See Colorado v. Bryant, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 557 (July 19, 2004). 
255 See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (striking down statute barring truthful 
publication of the name of alleged juvenile offender); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 525 (1989) 
(vacating as unconstitutional damage award against newspaper that had revealed name of rape 
complainant).   
256 For a useful discussion of the rationale for rape shield laws, see Tracey A. Berry, Comment, 
Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin’s Rape Shield Law: Will Those Words Come Back 
to Haunt You?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1243-44. 
257 Of course, the court also has inherent power to punish attorneys appearing in the case for 
disclosing such information contrary to court order.  See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils 
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) (“The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as 
essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete 
dependence on other Branches.”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to 
Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1311-13 (2003) 




The participant-centered view offers a nuanced approach to simultaneity and absence of 
mediation in the First Amendment analysis of Internet material related to terrorism.  It prevents 
ostensible incidental burdens on speech from impinging on content by focusing on the degree of 
independence of the defendant in material support cases.  Similarly, it protects independent publication 
on the Internet of information on terrorist tactics and scientific processes.  At the same time, however, 
the participant-centered approach recognizes that statements on the Internet expressly or implicitly 
endorsing violence, accompanied by specific and personal information about targeted individuals pose a 
special danger of intimidation.  With this nuanced approach, the participant-centered view avoids the 
risk of over- or under-regulation presented by Internet Exceptionalism. 
 
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
While the participant-centered approach has a number of advantages, it is always prudent to 
consider alternatives.  Two candidates are the categorical approach, which classifies various kinds of 
communication as less valuable or more dangerous, and the algorithmic approach, which imposes broad 
filtering requirements on ISP’s.   
 
A. A Categorical Approach to Information  
One alternative to the participant-centered view is a categorical approach.258  Instead of 
                                                 
258 See, e.g., Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 231. 
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focusing on any single overarching concept, such as promoting participation, the categorical approach 
supports regulation in particular areas, such as speech having virtually no First Amendment value259 and 
speech involving weapons of mass destruction.260  While the categorical approach sheds light on 
important First Amendment problems, it is ultimately unconvincing as a framework for analysis. 
The greatest overlap of the categorical approach with the participant-centered view is in the 
area of personal information, such as home phone numbers, home addresses, and Social Security 
numbers.  It is tempting to agree that such information lacks First Amendment value, and is useful 
primarily to facilitate illegal conduct such as identity theft.261  However, doubts remain.  First, as a 
general matter, it is dangerous for a democracy to place too much weight on the notion that some 
speech has no First Amendment value.  Categorizing speech as having or not having First Amendment 
value enhances the risk that conclusions will drive analysis and encourages habits in government that 
harm democratic deliberation.  As one commentator favoring this approach acknowledges, we cannot 
always know in advance what information will contribute to public debate.262  Given this lack of 
certainty, a democracy should probably eschew declaring whole areas of information valueless for First 
Amendment purposes.   
Second, it is far from clear that personal information is necessarily lacking in First Amendment 
value.  The Social Security number of a person in government or business, for example, may be useful in 
                                                 
259 Id.; Solove, supra note 5. 
260 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 231. 




determining whether that individual has provided false information in any transaction.  While 
conventional media outlets might decline as a matter of journalistic ethics or decorum to use such 
investigative tools, it is not clear that the legal system should enforce those informal journalistic 
standards.  Lawmakers should be especially wary of restrictions on the flow of information when less 
restrictive forms of mediation are available, such as laws that forbid disclosure of personal information 
by institutions such as state governments that require such information for particular legal purposes.263  
A similar analysis applies to information about weapons of mass destruction.  Here, too, the 
public has an interest in assessing society’s vulnerability and understanding the pervasiveness of 
knowledge about such devices and risks.  At the same time, the government is likely to overstate both 
the simultaneity and the unmediated nature of the risks involved.  For this reason, tailored tests dealing 
with persons who acquired knowledge through participation in scientific projects sponsored by the 
state, or conveyed the information as agents of a terrorist organization would be more appropriate here 
as well.264   
 
B. The Algorithmic Approach 
An extreme view of the cautionary approach might suggest that the most effective measures 
against terrorist exploitation of the Internet require the use of algorithms that would filter out information 
                                                 
263 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding federal Driver Privacy Protection 
Act, which imposed penalties on state selling driver information obtained by state as regulator of driving 
safety, and on persons obtaining information from state); cf. Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, supra 
note 7 (offering narrow reading of Condon). 
264 See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
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at the ISP level.  Such algorithms are already used in filters available to end-stage users who wish to 
screen out certain kinds of material, such as pornography.265  Requiring that ISP’s apply such 
technology to filter out sites containing terrorist material would constitute a far more proactive way to 
screen out such material – certainly more effective than deterrence at the source.   Unfortunately, 
however, the breadth of the material covered by algorithms would pose profound tensions with the First 
Amendment.266 
Algorithms, key words or phrases formulated for search purposes, are inevitably imprecise.267  
Although the government currently employs algorithms as part of its comprehensive and targeted 
surveillance of Internet traffic,268 algorithms used in a “filter” mode would be both over- and under-
                                                 
265 The term “algorithm” as used here takes in a range of software used by government and 
ISP’s.  See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792-93 (2004) (discussing development of Internet 
filters); United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of 
statute requiring filters in library computers as condition of federal funding); see also STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHING: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 40-42 (2002) (arguing that Carnivore can be misused); cf. 
ROSEN, supra note 57, at 196-97 (discussing government Internet “packet-sniffer” Carnivore, which 
allows the government acting pursuant to court order permitting collection of evidence of crime to sort 
out Internet traffic within scope of order); Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA 
Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 607, 649-54 (2003) (explaining 
Carnivore technology, and arguing that USA Patriot Act imposed new privacy restraints on Carnivore 
deployment); see generally Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003) 
(discussing controls at ISP level).  
266 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 231 (discussing First Amendment 
issues with this approach). 
267 See United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 220-22 (2003) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); cf. ROSEN, supra note 57, at 196-97 (urging government to make available source code for 
Carnivore, so that independent analysts can assess its efficacy). 
268 See ROSEN, supra note 57; SCHULHOFER, supra note 265; Kerr, supra note 265. 
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inclusive.  Algorithms that filter information tend to block websites and content offering general 
information about terrorist organizations – information useful to the public, researchers, journalists, and 
indeed government itself.  Conversely, filters designed to detect a particular word or phrase likely would 
fail to block coded information of a mobilizational or operational character.269   
Although the Supreme Court has upheld legislation requiring libraries that receive federal funds 
to use such filters as a condition of federal support,270 applying similar filters to ISP’s or end-stage users 
would likely constitute an unconstitutional content-based restriction, insufficiently tailored to government 
objectives.  The imprecision of algorithms, at least in their current state of development, would be of 
central concern.  Compounding that problem are related aspects of such filtering that make remedies for 
this imprecision ineffectual.  First, the algorithms themselves are usually secret and proprietary, impeding 
independent analysis that might enhance their precision.271  Second, although any such algorithmic 
approach would have to permit wrongly classified websites or other sources of information to seek relief 
on an individualized basis, any such process will necessarily be cumbersome, depriving the site of visitor 
access for substantial periods of time while relief is pending.  Even though the lack of mediation on the 
Internet can be problematic, algorithm-based filtering would represent an unmediated effort by 
government to enforce conformity, inimical to First Amendment values.  
Interventions at the ISP level, however, may be appropriate in more narrowly tailored 
                                                 
269 See Deibert & Stein, supra note 2, at 171 (discussing Al Qaeda’s use of verbal codes to 
convey instructions). 
270 United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
271 Id. at 233-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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contexts.272  When a site presents material that constitutes a true threat, or presents false information in a 
fashion that may present a danger to persons, the First Amendment should not bar the government from 
bringing such matters to the ISP’s attention, as apparently occurred regarding the false information 
about the address and phone number of the government’s chief witness in the prosecution of white 
supremacist Matthew Hale.273  The availability of narrowly tailored approaches demonstrates the folly of 
sweeping reliance on over- and under-inclusive algorithms. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
New media have always challenged our understanding of freedom of speech.  The government 
has often viewed new media with fear, driven by concerns that emerging technology will foment violence 
and decrease deliberation.  Typically, this fear of new technology has merged with fear of new arrivals 
to America.  The result has been a recurring tendency to restrict new media and target immigrants during 
times of crisis.  The legal system needs an approach that guards against the effects of fear while also 
addressing the contexts in which new technology such as the Internet can imperil a model of democracy 
based on civic engagement.  The participant-centered model seeks to fill that gap.   
Apprehensions about new technology and new arrivals were central to the struggles that 
attended the birth of the modern First Amendment.  Two overlapping concepts dominated these 
apprehensions: simultaneity and unmediated risk.  The speed of modern communications media and the 
                                                 
272 Cf. Zittrain, supra note 265. 
273 See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. 
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perceived identification of immigrant communities with America’s adversaries abroad raised concerns 
that, particularly in the difficult period surrounding America’s entry into World War I, immigrants would 
share strategic information with those adversaries.  The government was also concerned that then-new 
technologies such as cable, film, and targeted direct mail would become unmediated risks, inflaming 
communities and bypassing exposure to mediating mainstream discourse and institutions.  At the same 
time, prescient Progressives such as Brandeis saw in new media the potential for unprecedented 
intrusions on privacy that could impoverish civic life.   
Courts’ evolving understanding of the First Amendment reflects concerns about simultaneity and 
absence of mediation in times of national crisis.  In order to deal with those who opposed America’s 
imperialist alignments during World War I, courts first turned to the bad tendency test, which identified 
advocacy of particular ideas and creeds as posing a special risk of accelerated moral decline and decay, 
particularly in immigrant communities.  While the modern jurisprudence of the First Amendment 
reflected in Brandenburg purports to address the problems of simultaneity and unmediated risk with 
respect to potentially inflammatory speech, the challenges posed by Internet communications after 
September 11 have destabilized the modern First Amendment equilibrium.   
Scholars analyzing cyberissues have typically adopted what this article calls an Internet 
Exceptionalism view, which stresses virtual communication’s differences from earlier media in both 
technical architecture and user expectations.  In its celebratory iteration, Internet Exceptionalism lauds 
the simultaneity and absence of mediation of the Internet as facilitating communication beyond the oft-
constraining channels of traditional media.  In its cautionary iteration, Internet Exceptionalism rehearses 
the concerns about simultaneity and absence of mediation of earlier eras, evidencing a preoccupation 
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with the Internet’s contributions to polarization and fragmentation.  Courts have often shifted between 
these two modes, without developing a convincing synthesis.  
The relationship between the functionality of the Internet and the goals of terrorist organizations 
is far more nuanced.  Terrorist organizations, both domestic and foreign, may value the Internet’s 
geographic scope, the ability to reach a particularized audience at any time with continuously revised 
material, and the freedom from editing by outside “umpires” of taste.  These synergies may facilitate 
certain kinds of terrorist conspiracies, as well as intrusions on the lives of individuals or the activities of 
groups targeted by terrorist organizations.  However, the Internet also precipitates the risk that 
government will invoke simultaneity and absence of mediation to suppress extreme speech or 
information that should be in the public domain.  The Al-Hussayen case – in which a foreign student was 
deported for posting extreme speech on websites, allegedly with intent to encourage financial support of 
terrorist organizations – exemplifies these dangers.  In other words, the Internet Exceptionalism school 
leads to either under- or over-regulation of the Internet.   
The participant-centered approach outlined here stresses the interaction of the Internet, 
terrorism, and civic participation.  Inspired by the civic humanist thought of thinkers such as Hannah 
Arendt, as well as the pragmatic perspective on technology and media of Louis Brandeis, this approach 
focuses on the participatory lives of both speakers and audience members.  The approach recognizes 
that the Internet’s speed, sweep, and low entry barriers create extraordinary opportunities for global 
conversations.  It cautions against invoking simultaneity and absence of mediation to stifle extreme 
speech, suppress useful information, or stigmatize outsider groups such as immigrants.  At the same 
time, the participant-centered approach recognizes that the Internet can distort or deter civic 
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participation.  The Internet, for example, can enable entrepreneurs of collective violence to target 
individuals based on aspects of identity such as race, religion, or nationality, and to mobilize 
homogeneous, polarized, and geographically dispersed groups in both international and domestic 
arenas.  Entrepreneurs of collective violence and their followers can also harness the Internet to 
intimidate potential victims by coupling express or implied threats with the distribution of personal and 
“real-time” information. 
A participant-centered approach can sharpen our ability to analyze current controversies 
regarding the Internet and terrorism.  For example, with respect to the use of legislation barring “material 
support” of terrorist conspiracies or organizations, a participant-centered approach would require 
authorities to distinguish between Internet communications made by persons acting independently and 
such communications made by the organization’s agents or supporters for purposes of aiding a terrorist 
conspiracy.  Prosecution of independent persons for Internet communications urging others to support 
the group, or even providing postings or links that facilitate the supply of illegal or dangerous resources, 
is simply too close to the mere expression of opinion or provision of information penalized by the now-
discredited bad tendency test.  The speed and connectivity of the Internet, however, should not provide 
a justification for courts to dust off previously discredited doctrines.  By focusing on speakers’ degree of 
involvement with terrorist organizations, the participant-centered approach can distinguish between 
persons engaging in protected modes of extreme speech, and those persons engaging in criminal 
agreements that are not receptive to mediation.   
Similarly, a participant-centered approach would allow for the distribution on the Internet of 
information about tactics and scientific processes dealing with violence, as long as the sources of such 
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information did not actively collaborate with violent organizations or distribute such information as part 
of a conspiracy to commit violent acts.  Internet distribution of materials regarding weapons of mass 
destruction such as poisonous gases, or information about terrorist tactics, can refine the public debate 
about our nation’s vulnerabilities to violence, thereby promoting civic participation.  Thus, legal action 
against the distribution of scientific or tactical information would be permissible only when the parties’ 
brand of participation manifestly veered toward impermissible criminal agreements, or when pubic 
disclosure was facilitated by parties’ previous participation as “insiders,” rather than as licensees, in 
projects requiring secrecy for the facilitation of the creative enterprise.   
Finally, a participant-centered approach would apply true threat doctrine to impose civil and 
criminal remedies on individuals disclosing private citizens’ personal information over the Internet with 
the intent to intimidate individuals targeted for violent attacks.  People cannot participate in a democratic 
society unless they have some assurance that they will not be intimidated as a result of their participation. 
 Accordingly, the online publication of personal information as part of an express or implied threat of 
future violence stifles such engagement in public discourse.  The speed and lack of mediation of the 
Internet heighten this chilling effect.  Particularly in sensitive areas, such as testimony in a criminal trial or 
provision of reproductive health services, individuals engaging in arguably controversial modes of 
participation should not forfeit protection from threats of violence.  Internet sites similar to the 
“Nuremberg Files,” which combine individuals’ personal information with justifications for committing 
violence against those individuals, threaten participation and therefore constitute appropriate subjects for 
legal action. 
Admittedly, a participant-centered approach cannot deal with all of the issues posed by a still-
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developing medium such as the Internet.  The government will continue to invoke simultaneity and lack 
of mediation as justifications for speech-restrictive measures.  At the same time, committed terrorist 
operatives will continue to look for opportunities and vulnerabilities in information technology.  By 
arguing that civic engagement is a core value for both speaker and listener, however, the participant-
centered approach offers a framework that addresses both repression by the government and 
intimidation by private groups.  In the process, the participant-centered view seeks to maximize the 
Internet’s potential for enhancing democracy.     
